Sunday, December 24, 2017

Châu Phi và quan hệ quốc tế

Africa and international relations: Assembling Africa, studying the world 

This Research Note contributes to recent debates about Africa's place within the discipline of International Relations (IR). It argues that bringing Africa into IR cannot be simply a question of ‘add Africa and stir’, as the continent does not enter the discipline as a neutral object of study. Instead, it is already overdetermined and embedded within the politics and structure of values of the academe, which are in turn influenced in complex ways by changing geopolitics. The present combination of IR's increased awareness of its own Western-centrism and Africa's position as the new ‘frontline in the war on terror’ therefore harbours both opportunities and dangers, and bringing Africa into IR involves epistemological and methodological challenges relating to our object of study and political challenges relating to the contemporary securitization of Africa. The Research Note suggests that an assemblage approach offers a productive way of negotiating this encounter between IR and African Studies, making it possible to study Africa simultaneously as a place in the world and of the world, capturing the continent's politics and societies as both unique and global.


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Saturday, December 23, 2017

Đối tác chiến lược của Trung Quốc với châu Phi: Tầm quan trọng, Thách thức và Ý nghĩa đối với Hoa Kỳ

China’s Strategic Partnership With Africa: Significance, Challenges, And Implications For The United States

Relations between China and its African partners have become increasingly regularized and institutionalized, encompassing a broadening range of political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural and military ties. In the words of Chinese and African leaders, both sides are working to ―further deepen a new type of strategic partnership.To be sure, China’s security relations with Africa have elicited concerns and criticisms from the international community in recent years. In choosing close support for such countries as Angola, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Niger, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, China has selected some of the most corrupt and difficult environments. However, in many of these countries where China has sunken large sums of investments, it is quickly learning that a policy of pure self-interest is ill-fated and has begun to change its foreign policy behavior. To a large extent, this evolving behavior can be attributed to the result of social influence, where status, reputational risks, image concerns and a desire to maximize back-patting and minimize international opprobrium are increasingly important to Chinese policy elites. Such concepts as human rights, good governance, and accountability are entering (albeit gradually) the Chinese foreign policy calculus in Africa and are increasingly constraining and shaping its policy options. Put simply, Beijing appears to be more attuned to the sensitivities and complexities of regional conflicts in Africa.

Where then do we see this evolving Chinese approach toward African security issues in action, and where do we need to see much more? Supported in part by the USC U.S.-China Institute (USCI) for a month-long summer fieldwork research in China, this article identifies six key findings and draws from and ongoing research study on China-Africa security relations:

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8 dự án viện trợ lớn của Trung Quốc ở Châu Phi


8 major aid projects by China in Africa

1. Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) Railway (Tanzania, Zambia) 

The TAZARA Railway links the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam with the town of Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia. The railway is 1,860 km in length and was built as a turnkey project financed and executed by China. Construction began in 1970 and was completed in 1975. Construction costs were about $500 million. RICHARD STUPART / FOR CHINA DAILY

2. African Union Conference Center and Office Complex (Ethiopia)



As the headquarters of the African Union, the AU Conference Center cost $200 million and was totally funded by the Chinese government. It is the largest aid project by China in Africa since the TAZARA railway. The main building is 99.9 meters tall and is the tallest building in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. PHOTO/XINHUA

3. Merowe Dam (Sudan)

Located in northern Sudan on the Nile River, the Merowe Dam is the largest contemporary hydropower project in Africa, which contains a reservoir of 20 percent of the Nile's annual flow. It is largest foreign project the Chinese industry has ever participated in, and construction was finished in 2009. PHOTO/XINHUA

4. Zimpeto Stadium (Mozambique) 

The Zimpeto Stadium is a multi-use stadium in Zimpeto, Mozambique, which was inaugurated on April 23, 2011. It is mainly used for soccer and was the main stadium for the 2011 All-Africa Games. It has a capacity of 42,000 spectators. The stadium was built with funds from the Chinese government. PHOTO/XINHUA

5. Dakar National Grand Theater (Senegal) 

The Grand Theatre in Dakar was constructed from 2008-2011 by China National Complete Plant Import Export Corporation as a gift. The six-story, 1800 seat theatre was built at a cost of 16 billion CFA francs ($34 million), of which China paid 14 billion CFA francs and Senegal contributed the rest. PHOTO/XINHUA

6. Addis Ababa - Adama Expressway (Ethiopia) 

The Addis Ababa - Adama expressway, built at a cost of more than $709 million, will reduce average travel time of the 84km route from the current three hours to less than one hour. The sixlane highway is designed in accordance with Chinese standards, and the Chinese government provided concessionary loans. PHOTO/XINHUA

7. Maputo Airport New Terminals (Mozambique) 

As the largest airport in Mozambique, Maputo Airport was upgraded with concessionary loans from the Chinese government. The project includes two parts: the international terminal completed in 2010, and the domestic terminal in 2012. PHOTO/XINHUA

8. Mali Hospital (Mali) 

The Mali Hospital, built with Chinese aid, officially opened in September 2011, where China's medical aid team conducted the first heart operation in Mali. PHOTO/XINHUA


Thursday, December 21, 2017

Sách: Đầu tư của Trung Quốc ở châu Phi


Chinese Investment in Africa
How African Countries Can Position Themselves to Benefit from China’s Foray into Africa




China leads the world when it comes to investment and influence on the African continent. The extent of Chinese investment in Africa is well known and much has been written about China’s foray into Africa. However, most of the available material has approached this issue by looking at China as the ’New Colonialist’ – more interested in Africa’s vast natural resources than working in partnership for sustained development. Whilst China’s interest in Africa’s resources is evident, it is just half of the story.

China’s foray into Africa goes beyond its appetite for natural resources and into the realm of geo-politics and international political economics. For example, China is all too aware of how it can cultivate Africa’s support on global issues at the United Nations and at other international fora. Breaking free from the binary arguments and analysis which characterize this topic, Professor Abdulai presents a refreshing perspective that China’s foray into Africa can produce win–win outcomes for China and Africa – if Africans really know what they want from China.

Hitherto, each African country has tended to engage China with an individual bucket list; acting in isolation and not as part of a wider continent (indeed Africa and the African Union does not yet have a coordinated policy towards China). For Africa to be able to do that it needs to know where China is coming from, the factors that contributed to its awakening and success, and the benefits and possible pitfalls of this foray, in order to better position itself for a win–win engagement with China.

This book will be a valuable read for policy makers, think-tanks and students of Africa-China studies programmes alike.

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Tại sao các nước châu Phi nên học hỏi mô hình phát triển của Trung Quốc?

Why African Countries Should Emulate China's Development Model


Ventures Africa published on 15 December 2017 an article titled "Why African Countries Should Emulate China's Development Model" by Felicia Omari Ochelle. The article draws primarily on comments made by Helen Hai, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) Goodwill Ambassador and CEO of the Made in Africa Initiative.

Hai argues that "Africa should follow China's development model and aim to become a light-manufacturing hub." Hai says that in the next few years, some 85 million jobs will be exported from China. If African countries can capture many of those jobs, they can enjoy the same economic transformation that China had. The 54 African countries, one by one, will be able to attain this transformation, she argues.

If only it were so easy. UNIDO seems to be on a campaign to move light manufacturing jobs from China to Africa. While this is a noble goal, it is about more than lower wages in Africa than in China. Some non-African countries that are also building their light manufacturing capacity have lower wages than most African countries. It is also a matter of good infrastructure, access to ports, availability of skills, good nutrition and health, good governance, and lack of conflict and corruption. While a few African countries are well positioned to take advantage of light manufacturing jobs moving out of China, most would probably be better advised, at least for the time being, to focus on expanding and reforming agriculture.

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Wednesday, December 20, 2017

Series cập nhật sách chuyên khảo nghiên cứu về Trung Quốc (1999-2016)

DANH MỤC SÁCH NGHIÊN CỨU VỀ TRUNG QUỐC

Series cập nhật nghiên cứu về Trung Quốc là nội dung xuất bản hàng đầu của nước Úc để thảo luận và phân tích sâu về nền kinh tế, chính trị, xã hội và quan hệ quốc tế của Trung Quốc. Các cuốn sách có sự đóng góp của các nhà nghiên cứu hàng đầu thế giới, các nhà hoạch định chính sách và các đại diện từ các chính phủ được thảo luận về những nghiên cứu mới nhất về Trung Quốc.

Danh mục các sách gồm: 

Other titles in the China Update Book Series include:

1999: China: Twenty Years of Economic Reform

2002: China: WTO Entry and World Recession

2003: China: New Engine of World Growth

2004: China: Is Rapid Growth Sustainable?

2005: The China Boom and its Discontents

2006: China: The Turning Point in China’s Economic Development

2007: China: Linking Markets for Growth

2008: China’s Dilemma: Economic Growth, the Environment and Climate Change 

2009: China’s New Place in a World of Crisis

2010: China: The Next Twenty Years of Reform and Development

2011: Rising China: Global Challenges and Opportunities

2012: Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China

2013: China: A New Model for Growth and Development

2014: Deepening Reform for China’s Long-Term Growth and Development 

2015:  China’s Domestic Transformation in a Global Context

2016: China’s New Sources of Economic Growth: Vol. 1

2016: China’s New Sources of Economic Growth: Vol. 2


The titles are available online at press.anu.edu.au/publications/series/china-update-series

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Phòng ngừa xung đột thông qua quản lý tài nguyên thiên nhiên? Một nghiên cứu so sánh

Conflict Prevention Through Natural Resource Management? A Comparative Study


Natural resources are often held responsible for intrastate conflicts. As a consequence, both national and international measures to avoid the detrimental impact of resource endowments have increasingly been discussed and implemented in resource-rich countries. These measures include stabilization funds, subregional development programs, revenue-sharing regimes, and transparency initiatives. However, comparative empirical studies of the actual impact of these measures, particularly regarding their contribution to conflict prevention, are scarce. This paper contributes to the filling of this gap: combining a medium-N sample of oil-dependent countries and three in-depth case studies (Algeria, Nigeria, and Venezuela), we evaluate different instruments of resource management and their effects on conflict risk factors. On the one hand, the findings do not show any systematic connection between the countermeasures and a reduction in resource-related risks; on the other, the paper highlights common causal factors for the lack of implementation of resource-related countermeasures.


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Cân bằng quốc tế giữa lợi ích và tư tưởng: Trường hợp ngoại giao đối tác của Trung Quốc

International Alignment between Interests and Ideology: The Case of China’s Partnership Diplomacy (Trùng)

This paper examines the determinants of alignment in bilateral partnerships. While it was impossible to think about international cooperation without referring to the term "alliances" during much of the Cold War period, strategic partnerships have taken a central place in many states' diplomatic toolkits over the past two decades. This paper sheds light on such international alignment decisions by examining the case of China’s partnership diplomacy in the period from 1990 to 2014. Theoretically, the analysis draws on scholarly insights about alliance formation and international cooperation to formulate two broad assumptions about partner choice, which are based on interest‐driven and ideology‐based rationales of alignment. Binary regression estimations highlight the importance of economic interests in explaining partnership onset. In contrast to common arguments about alliance formation, partnerships seem to be less driven by shared domestic ideologies. In fact, bilateral partnerships help bridge ideological gaps, enabling the partners’ pursuit of economic gains and diplomatic preferences, at least in the case of China.

Georg Strüver (2016), International Alignment between Interests and Ideology: The Case of China’s Partnership Diplomacy, GIGA Working Paper, No. 283, March 2016


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Quan hệ đối tác Trung Quốc: Sự sắp xếp quốc tế dựa trên các quyền lợi

China's Partnership Diplomacy: International Alignment Based on Interests ir Ideology

While it was impossible during much of the Cold War period to think about international cooperation absent the term ‘alliances’, over the past two decades strategic partnerships have occupied a central position in many states’ diplomatic toolkit. This article sheds light on such international alignment decisions by examining the case of China’s partnership diplomacy during the period 1990 to 2015. Theoretically, the analysis draws on scholarly insights into alliance formation and international cooperation to formulate two broad assumptions about partner choice which are based on interest-driven and ideology-based rationales of alignment. Binary regression estimations highlight the importance of economic interests in explaining partnership onset. In contrast to common arguments about alliance formation, partnerships seem unlikely to be driven by shared domestic ideologies. In fact, bilateral partnerships help to bridge ideological gaps and to enable, at least in the case of China, the respective partners’ pursuit of economic gains and diplomatic preferences. With regard to the presumed payoffs of partnerships, the analysis further suggests that partnerships mean more to bilateral relations than purely nominal titles. Rather, they have measurable impact on partners’ economic relations as well as on convergence regarding their views on the international order. China’s growing spectrum of partnerships, therefore, expands the country’s potential to exert impact on international political outcomes.


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Quan hệ đối tác chiến lược của Trung Quốc: Các yếu tố quyết định và kết quả của sự sắp xếp quốc tế

 China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Determinants and Outcomes of International Alignment


This paper examines the determinants of alignment in bilateral partnerships. While it was impossible to think about international cooperation without referring to the term “alliances” during much of the Cold War period, strategic partnerships have taken a central place in many states’ diplomatic toolkits over the past two decades. This paper sheds light on such international alignment decisions by examining the case of China’s partnership diplomacy in the period from 1990 to 2014. Theoretically, the analysis draws on scholarly insights about alliance formation and international cooperation to formulate two broad assump‐ tions about partner choice, which are based on interest‐driven and ideology‐based rationales of alignment. Binary regression estimations highlight the importance of economic interests in explaining partnership onset. In contrast to common arguments about alliance for‐ mation, partnerships seem to be less driven by shared domestic ideologies. In fact, bilateral partnerships help bridge ideological gaps, enabling the partners’ pursuit of economic gains and diplomatic preferences, at least in the case of China.

Georg Strüver (2016), China’s Strategic Partnership Diplomacy: Determinants and Outcomes of International Alignment, German Institute of Global and Area Studies.

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Quan hệ đối tác chiến lược của Trung Quốc trên thế giới

China's Strategic Partnership Diplomacy


China has been actively engaged in developing strategic partnerships with third countries, particularly since the early 2000s. These partnerships have proven a prominent instrument in China’s diplomatic toolkit, in order to guarantee a benign environment for its rise. As China rises, and as part of the international community becomes increasingly suspicious of this ascent, Beijing’s strategic partnership diplomacy will face unprecedented challenges. China is thus likely to become more proactive and creative, differentiate more between different relationships and strive for a better connection between bilateral partnerships and other diplomatic tools.

 Zhongping, Feng and Jing, Huang, China's Strategic Partnership Diplomacy (June 27, 2014). ESPO Working Paper No. 8. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2459948

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Ảnh hưởng của Trung Quốc ở châu Phi

China’s influence in Africa: current roles and future prospects in resource extraction


In the second half of 2014, some African countries felt the heavy strike of falling prices of mineral resources on the world market. The international media raised vocalex positions on the negative impact that China’s slow down might bring to the African economy. One headline read: “Chinese investment in Africa has fallen 40 per cent this year – but it’s not all bad news”.1 More recently, the exasperation intensified to “China’s slowdown blights African economies”,2 and managed to shadow the China-African Summit held in December 2015 in Johannesburg. Similarly, on the recent Africa Mining Indaba, the annual biggest African event for the mining sector, the renewed concern was stated as “Gloom hangs over African mining as China growth slows”.3 There is no doubt that China’s presence has had positive effects on Africa’s growth over the past decade. Nonetheless, only a narrow perspective would view Africa’s weak performance solely through the Chinese prism. This article addresses the afore-mentioned concerns regarding the impacts that China has in Africa. A historical approach is applied to reconstruct the economic cooperation since the mid-1990s. This reconstruction emphasizes the sustaining forces of cooperation. Literally, this article goes beyond the resource traction sector, to understand the basis of China-African cooperation, and the position mineral resource has taken in the bilateral cooperation. With a representative country case study, the current dilemma is shown from the structure of bilateral cooperation. Suggestions follow on how to address these challenges.

Liu Haifang (2017), “China's Influence in Africa: Current Roles and Future Prospects in Resource Extraction”, Journal of Sustainable Development Law and Policy, Nigeria's Afe Babalola University, Vol 8 (1), pp.34-59.

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Tuesday, December 19, 2017

Is South Africa a gateway for China’s investment in Africa?

Africa is the world’s second-largest and second-most-populous continent with 54 different countries, consisting of a large diversity of ethnicities, cultures and languages. After the end of apartheid more than two decades ago, South Africa is an economic powerhouse in Africa. Though South Africa is still the largest economy in Southern Africa, Nigeria surpassed it as Africa’s largest economy in early 2014. The rapid rising economies of other African countries threaten South Africa’s position as a gateway to Africa.

Wharton’s global business week visit to South Africa in September 2016 provided first-hand experience through visits to multi-national companies, local companies and small start-ups in Johannesburg and Cape Town, across consulting, mining, construction, agriculture, financial services, energy, technology, telecommunication, healthcare, media and wine industries. The most striking factor is that China has a quite substantial economic presence in Africa. It also acquired a military base in Djibouti, which is complementary to its economic presence in Africa.

According to Voice of America, Chinese president Xi Jinping offered a whopping US$60bn loan and aid package to Africa in December 2015. Xi said that China aims to develop infrastructure, improve agriculture and reduce poverty on the continent. China’s investment in Africa is far beyond Xi’s recent offer: its investment there has skyrocketed from $7bn in 2008 to $26bn in 2013. China’s investment and economic influence in South Africa and the entire Africa continent is impressive.

Since China is Africa’s and South Africa’s largest trading partner and South Africa is the second-largest investment receiver from China (surpassed by Nigeria), based on the number of deals China has made with each African country, this paper will mainly assess South Africa as a gateway to Africa via the lens of China’s investment in Africa, to answer the question: Is South Africa a gateway to Africa for China’s Investment in Africa?

Where’s hot in Africa for China?

There are three primary motivations for China to invest in Africa:

1. Africa is very rich in natural resources with a considerable presence of diamonds, gold, silver, uranium, cobalt, wood, copper, aluminium and large oil reserves. Africa is estimated to contain 90% of the entire world supply of platinum and cobalt, half of the world’s gold supply, two-thirds of the world’s manganese and 35% of the world’s uranium. It also accounts for nearly 75% of the world’s coltan, an important mineral used in electronic devices, including cellphones. With the rapid economic growth after China’s 1978 economic reform, China faced a growing shortage of raw materials and it is hungry for raw materials to fuel its own economic growth. Africa is an ideal choice for China because of its abundant natural resources and eagerness to get help to develop their economies. China commonly funds the construction of infrastructure such as roads and railroads, dams, ports, and airports in exchange for the mining of raw materials. Mining investments account for nearly one-third of China’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) in African nations. By working to secure a solid base of critical raw materials, China has strengthened its economy for decades to come.

2. Africa as a big emerging market with a fast-growing population, presents a lot of business opportunities. Over the past decade, six of the world’s 10 fastest-growing countries were African countries. In eight of the past 10 years, Africa has grown faster than East Asia, including Japan. Besides that, China’s population growth is slowing down and aging due to its one child one family policy. Africa, in contrast, has a growing pool of low-cost young labourers, which gives Chinese companies a huge and cheap labour pool to tap into. Like Western countries, China’s investment in Africa is largely profit- and market opportunity-driven. According to recent studies, the foreign investment rate of returns in Africa are higher than that of any other major developing areas in the world.

3. As China became a global economic and political power, China’s investment and aid to help African countries build their economies, also helped China gain their support for its “One China” policy and increase its political influence for its foreign policy agendas in multilateral forums such as the United Nations. Besides that, China also served as a successful model for African countries led by non-democratic leaders.

However, it’s also very challenging to conduct business in Africa since it’s a continent with 54 countries. Each country has its own government and regulations. For example, doing business with the Nigerian government is very different than doing business with the South African government. Corruption and government inefficiencies are also very common in African countries. Exchange rate and interest rate volatilities can also impact businesses and profit margins in an unpredictable manner.

Those challenges could also present opportunities for foreign investors. Foreign investors who are good at building relationships in African countries will gain more advantages in the weak governance environment. Chinese investment is generally indifferent to the recipient countries’ regulations and governance environments since Chinese companies are used to the practices of conducting business in emerging markets. Western investors tend to stay away from the poor governance environments, which gives Chinese investors more opportunities with less competition from Western countries.

South Africa’s role for China’s investment in Africa 

Though South Africa has a lot to offer for China’s investment, South African companies also compete with Chinese companies in some sectors, such as infrastructure, construction and textiles, etc. This challenges South Africa’s position as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa. The relationship between South Africa and China is therefore a very unique partnership, characterised by both competition in the overlapping areas of interests and collaboration in the areas of shared common interests.

- South Africa is one of the wealthiest countries in terms of natural resources. It is a leading mining country and is renowned for having one of the most valuable mineral reserves in the world, which are estimated to be worth about $2.5tn. South Africa’s platinum and manganese reserves are the largest in the world. The country is also one of the leading producers of chromite ore, vanadium, gold, and diamonds. South Africa produces more than 10% of the word’s gold and has 50% of the global gold reserves. It is among the top ferrochrome producers in the world and has 72% of the globe’s chromite reserves and more than 80% of the globe’s platinum reserves. Because South Africa’s construction companies, such as Group Five (a leading African construction, concessions and manufacturing group with the ability to deliver across the full infrastructure life cycle), often compete with Chinese construction companies for the infrastructure projects in South Africa, it reduces the chances for Chinese investors to get into mining by funding the large-scale construction projects in South Africa. State-owned Chinese construction companies are still quite competitive because they have strong financial backup from the Chinese government and often have sufficient funds to offer the lowest bid for construction projects. In order to compete with Chinese companies, South African construction companies, such as Group Five, are working on providing whole package offers of handling all the design, construction, operation and financing by themselves. Group Five not only competes with Chinese construction companies in South Africa, but also in other sub-Saharan African countries. In parallel, Chinese construction companies and the government are exploring new opportunities in other natural resource-rich African countries and have invested in large construction projects in countries such as Nigeria ($12bn coastal railway project) and Angola ($5.8bn construction of oil refinery).
- South Africa’s GDP (in PPP terms) has almost tripled – to over $700bn – since international sanctions were lifted in 1996, the economy growing nearly 4.8% annually in PPP terms between 2005 and 2014. However, recent real GDP growth tells a different story, with 2014 growth of only 1.5% and 0.6% growth for 2016, the lowest since 2008. This slowdown has been driven by the weakening economies of trading partners (primarily China and Europe), electricity shortages, and extended strikes in the mining sector. Real GDP growth was forecast to increase to 2% through the 2015-2016 fiscal year on the back of a global recovery, as well as through growth in exports driven by a depreciating Rand. South Africa had about 54.96 million people (Figure 5) in 2015, with 47% of the population less than 24 years old. The unemployment rate in South Africa is 26.6%; and poor education contributes to the high unemployment rate. Though South Africa’s growing emerging market opportunity and young labour component still attract investors, other rapidly growing Africa countries, such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania and Mozambique, etc. have become credible alternative options for China’s investments.
- South Africa-China relations have become increasingly close with increasing trade, policy and political ties since 2007. Nelson Mandela had played a critical role to strengthen the relationship between China and South Africa by supporting the “One China” policy, including People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Republic of China (ROC). In the 2010 Beijing Declaration, South Africa was upgraded to the diplomatic status of Strategic Comprehensive Partner by the Chinese government. The relations between South Africa and China have evolved to the multi-faceted partnership we see today, which includes historical links, diplomatic relations, multilateral co-operation, trade and investment, and public media engagement. The two countries are finding points of convergence in their diplomatic engagements on the continent, and they have cooperated closely in the UN Security Council to further a range of peacekeeping initiatives in Africa. China’s approach to the continent’s development runs parallel to South Africa’s commitment to pursue regional infrastructure development. For example, Premier Li Keqiang announced that China would finance and construct a railway link between Nairobi and the port of Mombasa (with the possibility of extended routes to Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan) in May 2014, which aligns with President Xi Jinping’s articulation of a new ‘Maritime Silk Road’ between China, the Indian Ocean rim and the African eastern seaboard countries. South Africa and China also cooperate in the global arena by framing the participation of South Africa and China on shared multilateral platforms and provide mutual support in global forums such as the BRICS, the UN and G20 on multiple initiatives, which reflect their shared interest in reforming the global governance architecture to satisfy developing country needs. Meanwhile, the differences between South Africa and China continue to shape ties and distinguish them from China’s relations with other Africa countries. For example, South Africa and China have not always shared common positions in complicated cases like Sudan/South Sudan and Zimbabwe, and those two countries are also competing commercially in regional services and trade on the Africa continent; the love and hate relationship between South Africa and China, with both collaboration and competition, adds to the complexity of the partnership.

At present, the most significant link between South Africa and China, apart from diplomatic relations, is economic – with two-way trade accelerating since 2009. South African companies have enjoyed a degree of success through their presence in China, such as the case of South Africa’s media conglomerate, Naspers and its investment in China’s largest Internet company, Tencent. Another example is the winery La Motte, owned by the wealthy Rupert family. The CEO of La Motte Wine Estate, Hein Koegelenberg, skilfully leveraged his relationship with a former president of South Africa to help him market his wine to highly ranked Chinese officials, and middle and upper class Chinese as a high-end product with a unique French-sounding brand name. Koegelenberg enjoyed a much bigger demand in the China market than in the local South African market; he views the China market as a huge market and strategic opportunity for his company’s future growth. However, South Africa overall has a large trade deficit with China, driven by its high imports of value-added goods.

South Africa as a leading economy on the African continent, and especially in the Southern African region, has unique advantages of serving as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa. It has a diversified economy with investor-friendly regulations to attract foreign investors, relatively strong institutional structures, sophisticated financial services and better infrastructure availability compared to the majority of other African countries. For example, the better infrastructure availability in South Africa allows more profitable mining operations compared to other resource-rich locations with insufficient infrastructure, which could make mining economically unsustainable. Exxaro, for example, looked at a rich ore deposit in Congo, but had to skip it as there were no good transport options available. Besides that, South Africa’s rich natural resource base, domestic diversity and unique location flanked by the Atlantic Ocean on the west and the warm Indian Ocean on the east, also attracts not only Chinese investors, but also other Western investors.

South Africa also faces a lot of challenges, such as out-of-target inflation, rand depreciation, substandard education, economic growth slowdown and incompetent leadership, to name but a few. South Africa’s Reserve Bank targets inflation of 3% to 6%, but the country has struggled to maintain this range in recent years. In 2008, inflation spiked to double digits, driven by global increases in food and oil prices, as well as domestic issues, with a falling rand and electricity constraints. Inflation spiked again to 6.6% in mid-2014, before falling back into the target band in early 2015. The rand is also steadily depreciating due to labour market unrest and an increasing global unease with emerging markets. All these challenges add complexity to China’s investments in South Africa.

The merits of South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) Act are viewed with quite a lot of scepticism. The BBBEE act is a government initiative aimed at increasing the economic participation of black South Africans, which applies to all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and to private businesses with annual revenues over R10m (around $710,000). Businesses are rated based on a scorecard that allocates points for black empowerment across five metrics and are classified being either non-compliant or falling in a compliance level between BBBEE Level 1 (the highest) to Level 8 (the lowest). BBBEE scores have significant implications for an organisation’s ability to conduct business in South Africa.

For example, state entities are required to use BBBEE scores when contracting suppliers, issuing licences, or granting concessions. Industries that require government licences to operate (for example, financial services or liquor) typically require higher BBBEE scores. Financial services, construction, and extractives have the highest overall scores, while retail, manufacturing, and transport tend to have the lowest. This initiative puts a lot of weight on individual businesses to change the socio-economic landscape of South Africa without having enough support from the government in terms of improving the education system to help black South Africans gain required skills for the job or other avenues for change. BBBEE also makes it harder for foreign investors to operate in South Africa, while it creates a big and inexpensive labour pool for enterprises with the assumption that there are sufficiently qualified black South Africans.

Despite all these challenges of doing business in South Africa, the country has served as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa and especially in the Southern Africa region. Considering South Africa’s strategic partnership with China, it will continue serving as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa. However, South Africa will not be the only gateway for China’s investment in Africa and its position as a gateway is also challenged by other rising economies on the Africa continent.

For example, the Chinese are actively scouting infrastructure projects in Africa and will be more than happy to fund infrastructure construction to gain access to the mining industry with local government support. Other mineral-rich locations will become more economically attractive once infrastructure improves throughout the continent. Though South Africa has the most well-developed, business-friendly policy framework in the region, regulatory policy varies significantly from country to country. Chinese investors, as well as Western investors, still need to evaluate each African country independently to understand the local regulations and policies for conducting business. From that perspective, South Africa cannot effectively serve as the only gateway to the rest of region and the African continent. With the increasing competition from other African countries, South Africa can no longer take its position in Africa, and its unique partnership with China, for granted.

What Western countries can learn from China 

Though Western media sources consistently condemn China’s no-strings-attached attitude towards dealing with African regimes, supporters say that China’s initiatives to build and improve infrastructure such as roads, railways and telecom systems have been a boon to Africa’s manufacturing sector; have freed up domestic resources for other critical needs such as healthcare and education; and have aided everyone doing business on the continent. The entrance of China into Africa has shifted the paradigm that urged the West to rethink their strategy in Africa. The business and political influence China has established in South Africa and Africa largely contribute to three key practices:

- China has essentially treated Africa with far more dignity than Western governments. It treated Africa not as a continent in need of saving or lecturing, but as partners in a long-term business deal. China strikes business deals that exchange loans, infrastructure aid and goods in exchange for African commodities, political support and access to its vast and emerging markets, while leaving Africans alone in finding solutions to their problems.
- China doesn’t stay away from countries with poor governance in terms of property rights and rule of law, while Western investors tend to stay away from countries with weak governance. China takes more risks, which rewards it with more business opportunities.
- Chinese companies act very fast by working 12 hours a day and six days a week as a norm, while Western companies usually care about work life balance and can’t match the speed of China.

Although the West, and particularly the United States, retains key advantages, including possessing more transparent political models, better and more mature technologies in certain key sectors, and recognisable global brands that China still lacks, China’s presence provides alternatives to African nations minus the traditional political interference of Western countries. As more states, such as India, Brazil and others, seek to gain influence on the continent, African countries are at an unprecedented position where their strategic options are better than at any time before. It is crucial that the United States and other Western nations begin to reassess their attitudes and strategies in Africa in order to solidify partnerships with African countries as the continent gains more prominence in the future.

Conclusion 

South Africa has served as a gateway for China’s investment in Africa and especially the Southern Africa region, but its role as a gateway is declining because other fast-growing African countries are becoming attractive alternatives, not only for China’s investments, but also for other foreign investment. Considering South Africa’s strategic partnership with China, South Africa will continue serving as an important gateway for China’s investment in Africa and especially in the Southern Africa region by operating at bilateral, continental and multilateral levels with government involvements from both countries. However, South Africa will not be the only gateway for China’s investment in South Africa. China will be very practical to cooperate with South Africa for the areas in which the two countries share common interests, and cooperate with other African countries based on the strengths, economic and political fit assessment of each African country. Potential destinations for future Chinese investment in the African continent also depends on opportunities in the industry sectors and the investment destination decision could vary for different industry sectors.

The rise of other African countries, and China’s rapid expansion in Africa, are bringing new economic and political dynamics to Africa and the world. This also brings healthy competition and collaboration for African countries, as more countries, such as China, India, Brazil, besides well-established Western countries such as the United States, seek to gain more influence in Africa. The healthy competition will also help South Africa to defend and grow its role as a gateway to Africa, because South Africa can no longer take it for granted in the future.

Natalie (Qiaolin) Mao is a second-year MBA for Executives student of the Wharton School. Natalie has worked for Microsoft globally in both the US headquarters and China, and she is currently a principal product manager in Microsoft Artificial Intelligence & Research Group. Natalie holds multiple US patents and has rich industry experience with expertise in online advertising, search, knowledge graph & big data, and digital media. Natalie is a co-founder for two non-profit organisations – ACM SIGKDD Seattle chapter and Chinese Women in Computing, actively advocating for data mining & machine learning education and connecting Chinese technical women globally to help each other achieve more. Natalie loves travelling, experiencing different cultures, writing, and yoga.

Sunday, December 17, 2017

China-Africa Trade Developments and Impacts: Case of China-Zambia Relations

This study sought to undertake a critical comparative assessment of the trade (and other underpinning socioeconomic) developments in China, Africa and Zambia, with a view to understanding their impetus as well as their consequences, both positive and negative, for China- Africa and China -Zambia ties. It offers unique perspectives and understanding about China-Africa and China-Zambia relations. It takes a look at the history and present-day China- Africa and China-Zambia relations, considering the social and cultural ties that have defined cooperation as well as the political and diplomatic relations that have been forged over time. It unravels the trade and development implications of these relations for Zambia, Africa and China.

From Dependency to Partnership: Where are AU-EU Relations Heading

This policy brief considers the prospects of the relationship between the AU and the EU maturing beyond the traditional dependency model. Although great progress has been made since the EU was established and its relationship with predominantly ex-colonies has been given specific structure and content, the EU still sets the agenda and scope of financial assistance to implement this. The policy brief provides an overview of the proposed agenda and likely outcomes of the fifth AU–EU Summit of Heads of State and Government, which takes place in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, in November 2017. Despite advances, the AU–EU relationship is not yet a true partnership. The brief makes recommendations towards attaining the partnership goal.


Valetta 2015 to Abidjan 2017: Recent Trends in AU-EU Migration Relations

Ahead of the fifth AU–EU Summit in November 2017, this policy brief identifies changing trends in Africa–EU migration relations under the 2007 Joint Africa– EU Strategy (JAES), the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and the outcomes from the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration. It also examines bilateral Africa–EU relations against the broader backdrop of the UN Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the ongoing international discussions on a global framework for migration management that seek to normalise and regularise migration to Europe through policy interventions across the continent. The brief concludes with recommendations that reflect key policy issues for the upcoming AU–EU Summit.

The Revitalization of the ARCSS and the Prospects for Peace in South Sudan

This policy paper evaluates the prospects of peace in South Sudan within the context of the recently proposed revitalization process of the 2015 political pact. The paper broadly argues that the revitalization process is important, but it must contend with factors that led to the collapse of the original agreement. Highlighting this, the brief discusses how the design of the security arrangements and transitional justice mechanisms in the ARCSS might have led to the faltering of security and stability in the country. A new approach to the mediation process, which puts primacy on constructive diplomacy and provision of incentives to the parties and the combatants, and the need to popularize the agreement among the citizens to embrace the peace agreement, is suggested.


The G20's Contribution to Sustainable Development in Africa


The Group of Twenty (G20), as a forum for international cooperation on global economic governance and finance, has supported African development through the introduction of various initiatives and plans. The expansion of its original mandate has led the group to include other issues that directly impact Africa. It is crucial that the G20 development agenda remains cognisent of the development of the AU’s Agenda 2063 and the need to meet the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). As such, this discussion paper conducts a comparative analysis of the UN SDGs and the AU agenda, as well as existing G20 initiatives. In view of the gaps that have been identified, recommendations are made to the South African government – as a member of the G20 – on how future G20 engagements could support African objectives, in particular the African Development Agenda 2063 and the SDGs, in a more meaningful and effective manner.


African Union: What are the Possible Options for Strategic Autonomy?

This Policy Brief is also available in French titled: Union Africaine : Quelles options d’autonomie stratégique possibles ? The current economic, political and geo-strategic dynamics, centered on the major regional groups, announce a reconfiguration of the international order in which Africa is called to play an important role through its main continental institution which is the African Union (AU). The AU is increasingly emerging as the continent's platform with foreign partners, and continues to face problems of dependence, governance and leadership. Therefore, in a critical and forward-looking approach, the present Policy Brief, drafted in the wake of the international APSACO conference, intends to question the AU's Strategic Autonomy and suggest concrete ways and means to achieve it.


What 2017 taught us about African politics

The last 12 months have been a confusing time for African democracy. We have seen coups that didn’t look like coups and elections that didn’t look like elections. In this sense, it was a year of illusions.

As in 2016, the broad trend is clear – with a number of notable exceptions, the gains made in the early 1990s are under threat from governments with little commitment to plural politics. But while 2017 provided further evidence of the danger of democratic backsliding, it also saw powerful presidents suffer embarrassing setbacks in a number of countries.

So what lessons does 2017 have to teach us, and what is going to grab the headlines next year?

1. Don’t mess with the military

In November 2016, the Zimbabwean Defence Forces placed president Robert Mugabe under house arrest and subsequently orchestrated his removal from power. The intervention was cleverly framed as a corrective action to remove “criminal” elements around the president. In reality, it represented an effort by the military to protect its own political and economic interests. 

Once the head of the army, General Constantino Chiwenga, had spoken out against “purges” within the ruling party, he faced being replaced, arrested and charged with treason – and at that point, had little to lose and everything to gain from military intervention.

The ousting of Mugabe therefore serves as an important reminder that despite 30 years of multiparty elections in Africa, messing with the military can still be fatal. Coups are usually justified on the grounds that they are in the national interest, but are actually triggered by threats to the security, pay and conditions of the security forces themselves.

2. If you are polite you can get away with murder

The military intervention in Zimbabwe was also remarkable for being the politest coup in history. Worried that they would be accused of stabbing a nationalist leader in the back – and concerned to avoid regional or international criticism – the coup plotters went to remarkable lengths to make their usurpation of power look constitutional. Instead of being executed or sent into exile, Mugabe was allowed to remain in his house and had his picture taken with his captors. 

All of this was designed to create a cover for private negotiations in which the president was pressed to “voluntarily resign” in order to sustain the image of a legitimate transfer of power.

Amazingly, it worked. Delighted to see the back of Mugabe, the “transition” was broadly welcomed around the world. The willingness of so many people to play along with the idea of a bloodless coup is deeply problematic, first because it may encourage security forces in other countries to try and repeat the trick, and second because it is false. There are growing reports that a number of human rights abuses occurred as the military moved to exert political control. When the testimonies of the victims are finally heard, it will cast a very different light on the coup, and the government that it has put in place.

3. Judges can’t save democracy

The Kenyan Supreme Court made history when it became the first judicial body on the continent to nullify the election of a sitting president – Uhuru Kenyatta – on 1 September. This remarkable assertion of judicial independence was celebrated throughout Africa and beyond, as democrats dared to dream of a new phase of judicial activism. 

However, any hope that the need to repeat the election would lead to widespread reforms and a better quality process turned out to be overly optimistic. Instead, evidence that political interference in the electoral commission was undermining efforts to strengthen the system led to an opposition boycott. As a result, President Kenyatta won the second poll by a landslide, but without the legitimacy and mandate that such a majority would normally give rise to.

Kenya’s experience in 2017 demonstrates that more independent judiciaries can have a major impact on democracy, but also that this impact is constrained by weaknesses elsewhere in the political system. Because Supreme Courts lack both legislative and enforcement powers, they are dependent on others for their decisions to be implemented. In turn, this means that the same problems that have been identified in electoral commissions, legislatures, and political parties ultimately hamper the ability of judges to enforce the rule of law. 

4. Political exclusion breeds secessionism

One of the main stories of the last 12 months is an upsurge of secessionist sentiment in Cameroon, Kenya and Nigeria. Significantly, while the demand for the creation of a separate state has complex roots, in each case it was triggered by perceptions of political exclusion. 

Although these movements have very different dynamics, they have all led to protests and met with a hostile state response. Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, they are also movements that don’t really want to secede: in each case, opposition leaders are using the threat of separation as a way to highlight – and contest – their political exclusion. Nonetheless, unless some of their demands are met, secessionist sentiment is likely to harden, undermining national identities and paving the way for future political crises.  

5. Western companies remain part of the problem

The negative social, environmental and political impact of some multinational companies operating in Africa is well known, especially when it comes to the extraction of natural resources and bribing governments to secure lucrative contracts. What 2017 revealed was the extent to which this is also true of the public relations firms that parties and leaders hire to make them look better. 

The most high profile example of this was Bell Pottinger, a British “reputational management agency” that stands accused of designing a campaign to stir up racial tensions in South Africa as a way of deflecting attention away from the poor performance of the African National Congress government. Although the company was paid extremely well for the work - £100 000 a month – this proved to be little compensation when the scandal broke and it was forced into administration.

However, while Bell Pottinger has gone, many of the multinational companies who do this kind of work continue to operate. Along with the lucrative nature of these contacts, this suggests that Western companies will continue to play a questionable role in African elections in the future.

2018 and after

The next 12 months are not likely to be kind to African democracy. Very rarely has the continent seen so many elections scheduled in such unpromising contexts. Early elections in Sierra Leone have the best prospects of going well, but after that there is a serious risk of flawed processes and controversial outcomes in a series of legislative elections that will be held in highly authoritarian countries: Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Rwanda, Swaziland and Togo. 

Of course, parliamentary polls are not as high profile as presidential elections, but these are unlikely to offer too much cheer to the continent’s democrats. General elections are currently scheduled in Cameroon, Mali, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. The great challenge facing Mali and South Sudan is organising a credible contest against a backdrop of political instability and weak institutions. The situation is markedly different in Cameroon and Zimbabwe, where entrenched regimes that tightly control the political landscape will hold elections that they have no intention of losing.  

It is important not to be defeatist though – in the last few years the most significant democratic breakthroughs have been unanticipated. Few predicted the defeat of Yahya Jammeh, the victory of the opposition in Nigeria, or the decision of the Supreme Court in Kenya. The next great democratic moment could be just around the corner…

A version of this article was originally published on The Conversation. Read it here. 

(Main image: Jack Taylor/Getty Images)