Nga, Trung Quốc thúc đẩy BRICS “soán ngôi” Mỹ và G-7?

Đại Tá Lê Thế Mẫu.

VietTimes -- Đến năm 2035, tiềm lực kinh tế của các quốc gia trong khối BRICS sẽ vượt xa các nước phát triển trong Nhóm G-7. Vai trò và ảnh hưởng của BRICS trong trật tự kinh tế thế giới còn được quyết định bởi vị thế của lục địa Á-Âu, nơi có 3 thành viên chủ chốt của liên kết này là Nga, Trung Quốc và Ấn Độ.

Tại Hội nghị thượng đỉnh các nước có nền kinh tế mới nổi BRICS (gồm Brazil, Nga, Ấn Độ, Trung Quốc và Cộng hòa Nam Phi) lần thứ 9 vừa kết thúc vào đầu tháng 9/2017 tại Hạ Môn (Trung Quốc), Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình tuyên bố rằng BRICS đang đứng trước triển vọng bước vào “thập kỷ vàng” của sự phát triển. Vậy triển vọng phát triển của BRICS sẽ ra sao?

BRICS: hiện thực địa chính trị mới trong thế giới đương đại

Liên kết BRICS ra đời từ ý tưởng ban đầu xây dựng “tam giác chiến lược” mang tên RIC, gồm 3 nước Nga-R (Russia), Ấn Độ-I (India) và Trung Quốc-C (China), do cựu Ngoại trưởng Liên Xô và là cựu Thủ tướng Nga, ông Evgenhy Primacov, đề xuất. Khi Evgenhy Primacov đưa ra sáng kiến này vào năm 1998, nhiều chuyên gia nghiên cứu chính trị và không ít chính khách ở Nga cũng như trên thế giới lúc đó đánh giá ý tưởng đó là "không thiết thực" và "không có tính khả thi".

Thế nhưng, sau 10 năm, vào năm 2009, RIC đã phát triển thành BRIC sau khi kết nạp thêm Brasil (B) tại Hội nghị thượng đỉnh lần đầu tiên được tổ chức tại Nga. Đến năm 2011, BRIC kết nạp thêm Cộng hòa Nam Phi (S-South Africa), trở thành BRICS. Hiện nay, BRICS không những trở thành hiện tượng kinh tế-chính trị sống động mà còn có sức lan toả mạnh mẽ ra bên ngoài phạm vi lục địa Á-Âu, trở thành diễn đàn có quy mô và phạm vi toàn cầu.

Đến năm 2017, BRICS đã trải qua 9 lần Hội nghị thượng đỉnh và đang cạnh tranh ảnh hưởng với Nhóm G-7 bao gồm 7 nước công nghiệp phát triển hàng đầu thế giới. Nhiều nước đang phát triển khác như Indonesia, Mehico, Egypt. Iran… đang “xếp hàng” để được kết nạp vào BRICS [1].

BRICS-một cực trong trật tự thế giới đa cực đang hình thành

Sự kiện Donald Trump-người chủ trương đưa nước Mỹ quay trở về với chủ nghĩa biệt lập, trở thành Tổng thống 45 của Hoa Kỳ là một cú huých làm gia tăng xu hướng của thế giới dịch chuyển nhanh chóng tới trật tự thế giới đa cực. Quyết định đầu tiên của Tổng thống Mỹ Donald Trump là đưa Mỹ rút khỏi Hiệp định đối tác xuyên Thái Bình Dương (TPP) và ngừng đàm phán về Hiệp định đầu tư-thương mại xuyên Đại Tây Dương (TTIP) đã tạo ra khoảng trống lớn trong không gian kinh tế toàn cầu và vô hình trung thúc đẩy BRICS hướng mạnh mẽ tới vị thế mới và có thể đóng vai trò một cực trong trật tự thế giới đa cực đang hình thành.

Ý tưởng xây dựng trật tự thế giới mới đa cực lần đầu tiên được Tổng thống Nga V.Putin chính thức tuyên bố tại Hội nghị an ninh quốc tế Munich năm 2007. Theo V.Putin, trật tự thế giới đơn cực hoàn toàn xa lạ với các giá trị dân chủ mà chính các nước Phương Tây tôn thờ. Ý tưởng này của V.Putin nhận được sự ủng hộ của nguyên thủ nhiều nước, trong đó có các quốc gia trong BRICS.

Hội nghị thượng đỉnh chính thức lần đầu tiên vào ngày 16/6/2009 tại thành phố Yekaterinburg của Liên bang Nga tập trung bàn thảo các biện pháp nhằm đưa thế giới thoát khỏi cuộc khủng hoảng tài chính-kinh tế toàn cầu bùng phát từ Mỹ năm 2008, trong đó có biện pháp mang tính chiến lược lâu dài là cải cách hai thể chế tài chính quốc tế là Quỹ tiền tệ quốc tế (IMF) và Ngân hàng thế giới (WB) đã từng thể hiện sự bất lực trong việc hóa giải cuộc khủng hoảng kinh tế thế giới. Tuyên bố chung của Hội nghị thượng đỉnh BRIC lần thứ 1 đề cập tới sự cần thiết hình thành một đồng tiền dự trữ toàn cầu mới và tăng cường vai trò đồng nội tệ của các quốc gia nhằm hạn chế vai trò thống trị và chi phối của đồng đô la Mỹ (USD)-trụ cột của trật tự kinh tế thế giới đơn cực do Mỹ áp đặt luật chơi.

Tới Hội nghị thượng đỉnh BRIC lần thứ 2 vào năm 2010, Cộng hòa Nam Phi chính thức tham gia và BRIC phát triển thành BRICS. Tại Hội nghị thượng đỉnh lần thứ 6 năm 2014 ở Brasil, BRICS thông qua một quyết định rất quan trọng, đánh dấu sự phát triển có tính bước ngoặt hướng tới trật tự thế giới đa cực. Đó là, thành lập Ngân hàng phát triển mới, gọi tắt là NDB, với tổng số vốn điều lệ 100 tỷ USD và Quỹ dự phòng rủi ro với nguồn vốn ban đầu 100 tỷ USD. Ngoài ra, các nước BRICS còn chủ trương sẽ không sử dụng USD như đồng tiền thanh toán duy nhất, mà sẽ sử dụng đồng nội tệ của các nước thành viên trong giao dịch thương mại giữa các nước.

Theo hướng đó, Trung Quốc và Nga xây dựng và đưa vào sử dụng hệ thống thanh toán quốc tế SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) riêng sử dụng đồng Ruble và đồng Nhân dân tệ. Động thái này là tiếng chuông cảnh báo không chỉ về sự cáo chung kỷ nguyên thống trị của USD trên phạm vi toàn cầu trong hơn 100 năm qua mà còn là tín hiệu rõ ràng về sự hình thành trật tự kinh tế thế giới mới, thay thế trật tự tài chính-kinh tế toàn cầu do Mỹ đứng đầu tạo dựng sau Chiến tranh thế giới II [2].

Hội nghị thượng đỉnh BRICS lần thứ 7 năm 2015 được tổ chức ở Ufa, thủ phủ của Cộng hòa Bashkortostan (Nga), đánh dấu bước phát triển mang tính đột phá, chứng tỏ định hướng tới trật tự thế giới đa cực không thể đảo ngược và mọi nỗ lực của Mỹ tự cho mình đóng vai trò “lãnh đạo” trật tự thế giới đơn cực để bao vây cấm vận Nga đã thất bại. 

Hội nghị thượng đỉnh BRICS lần thứ 7 là bước tiến quan trọng nhằm thể chế hóa các cơ chế hợp tác thực chất, có hiệu quả và xây dựng công cụ cơ bản cho trật tự kinh tế và chính trị thế giới đa cực như quyết định đặt trụ sở của NDB tại Thượng Hải và sẽ hoạt động từ ngày 30/7/2015 với số vốn ban đầu là 50 tỷ USD và sẽ tăng lên khoảng 100 tỷ USD trong những năm tới. Ngoài ra, các nước thành viên của nhóm còn lập một quỹ dự trữ ngoại tệ chung trị giá 100 tỷ USD, trong đó Trung Quốc đóng góp 41 tỷ USD; Nga, Ấn Độ và Brasil mỗi nước đóng góp 18 tỷ USD, còn Cộng hòa Nam Phi đóng góp 5 tỷ USD.

BRICS hy vọng hai định chế tài chính này nhằm mục tiêu hỗ trợ các dự án cơ sở hạ tầng tại các nước đang phát triển và sẽ là sự lựa chọn thay thế cho các định chế tài chính thế giới như WB hay IMF. Theo dự kiến, một loạt dự án khổng lồ về giao thông, năng lượng và sản xuất công nghiệp sẽ nhận được vốn vay của Ngân hàng phát triển BRICS từ năm 2016. Cũng tại Hội nghị thượng đỉnh lần thứ 7, BRICS đề xuất chủ trương tích hợp các dự án của các nước thành viên BRICS và SCO với Liên minh kinh tế Á-Âu và dự án “Con đường tơ lụa mới” do Trung Quốc đề xuất. Sự liên kết BRICS và SCO là hiện thực địa chính trị mới trong trật tự thế giới.

Năm 2016, Hội nghị thượng đỉnh BRICS lần thứ 8 tại tại bang Goa của Ấn Độ thông qua Tuyên bố chung, tiếp tục khẳng định vai trò là một tổ chức đang hướng mạnh mẽ tới vị thế là một cực trong trật tự thế giới đa cực. Tuyên bố chung nhấn mạnh, các nước thành viên BRICS thống nhất quan điểm về những biến đổi sâu sắc hiện nay trên thế giới theo hướng chuyển sang trật tự quốc tế đa cực, dân chủ và công bằng trên cơ sở vai trò trung tâm của Liên hợp quốc (LHQ) và tôn trọng luật pháp quốc tế. BRICS cũng khẳng định cần phối hợp giải quyết các vấn đề toàn cầu và hợp tác thiết thực trên tinh thần đoàn kết, hiểu biết và tin tưởng nhau.

Tại Hội nghị thượng đỉnh năm 2017 với chủ đề “Tăng cường quan hệ đối tác trong khuôn khổ BRICS, tạo dựng tương lai tốt đẹp hơn”, Tuyên bố chung của BIRCS chỉ trích các hành động đơn phương can thiệp quân sự và áp dụng các biện pháp trừng phạt kinh tế nhằm vào các quốc gia có chủ quyền và là thành viên của LHQ. BRICS khẳng định rằng để thiết lập một nền hòa bình lâu dài cần phải có cách tiếp cận toàn diện dựa trên sự tin tưởng lẫn nhau, cùng có lợi và dựa trên cơ sở công pháp quốc tế.

Với cách tiếp cận đó, BRICS lên án sự can thiệp quân sự đơn phương, các biện pháp trừng phạt kinh tế và việc sử dụng tùy tiện các biện pháp cưỡng chế đơn phương vi phạm luật pháp quốc tế và các chuẩn mực phổ biến được công nhận trong quan hệ quốc tế. BRICS nhấn mạnh rằng, không một quốc gia nào có thể tăng cường an ninh của mình bằng cách gây phương hại tới an ninh của nước khác.

Phát biểu tại Hội nghị, Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình nhận định: “BRICS đang trải qua giai đoạn phát triển có ý nghĩa then chốt, trong bối cảnh trật tự thế giới đang trải qua những biến đổi sâu sắc, trong đó luật rừng không thể có hiệu lực vì đi ngược lại logic phát triển của thời đại. Trong những năm tới sẽ là “thập kỷ vàng” của BRICS”. “Thập kỷ vàng” không chỉ là thời cơ phát triển mạnh mẽ của BRICS mà còn có một ý nghĩa khác. Đó là, Trung Quốc và Nga sẽ đưa vào sử dụng đồng Ruble và Nhân dân tệ được bảo đảm mệnh giá bằng vàng. Quyết định này sẽ làm sụp đổ vị thế của USD hiện chỉ được bảo đảm bằng dầu mỏ và đang bị nhiều nước từ chối sử dụng trong thanh toán thương mại quốc tế. Với những gì đã đạt được đến thời điểm này, BRICS thực sự đang hướng tới vị thế là một cực trong nền kinh tế và chính trị thế giới [3-5].

Theo dự báo của nhà kinh tế nổi tiếng thế giới Jim O'Neill-người đầu tiên đưa ta dự báo về triển vọng phát triển mạnh mẽ của BRICS, đến năm 2035, tiềm lực kinh tế của các quốc gia trong liên kết này sẽ vượt xa các nước phát triển trong Nhóm G-7. Vai trò và ảnh hưởng của BRICS trong trật tự kinh tế thế giới còn được quyết định bởi vị thế của lục địa Á-Âu, nơi có 3 thành viên chủ chốt của liên kết này là Nga, Trung Quốc và Ấn Độ.

Trong tương lai, sẽ có nhiều quốc gia khác trên lục địa này tham gia BRICS. Lục địa Á-Âu hiện chiếm hơn 75% tổng dân số toàn cầu và 65% tổng sản phẩm quốc dân của thế giới, cũng là nơi tập trung tới 70% tổng trữ lượng tài nguyên năng lượng của thế giới. Điều đó có nghĩa là sự phát triển nền kinh tế toàn cầu, trước hết là của nhóm các quốc gia công nghiệp phát triển G-7, phụ thuộc vào nguồn cung dầu mỏ và khí đốt từ các quốc gia thuộc khu vực Châu Á-Thái Bình Dương và Trung Cận Đông, nơi BRICS và SCO có ảnh hưởng rất lớn.  

Sự nổi lên và phát triển của nhóm BRICS vào thời điểm cộng đồng quốc tế ngày càng thiếu tin tưởng vào tương lai của hệ thống thế giới đã từng tồn tại từ sau Chiến tranh thế giới thứ II. Trong một thế giới toàn cầu hóa mạnh mẽ và hội nhập quốc tế ngày càng sâu sắc sau Chiến tranh lạnh, hệ thống này đã không còn phù hợp với thực tế. Tuy nhiên, cũng như bất kỳ một liên kết nào trong một thế giới đang biến động nhanh chóng và không ngừng, BRICS sẽ phải đối mặt với nhiều thách thức cần phải vượt qua như xây dựng khu vực tự do thương mại chung BRICS FTA trong điều kiện trình độ phát triển không đồng đều của các nước thành viên hay là việc kết nạp các thành viên mới cũng như chủ trương phối hợp nỗ lực để hóa giải các nguy cơ mang tính toàn cầu./.

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Tài liệu tham khảo

[1]БРИКС и ее влияние на многополярный мир. http://inosmi.ru/world/20140811/222300359.html

[2] Россия и Китай готовы создать аналог SWIFT. http://www.aup.ru/news/2014/09/11/7062.html

[3] Вместе против доллара: чем вызван активный интерес к саммиту БРИКС. https://russian.rt.com/business/article/425396-briks-sammit-kitai

[4] Си Цзиньпин предрек странам БРИКС «золотое десятилетие». http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1923464/

[5] Саммит в Сямэне откроет второе «золотое десятилетие» в сотрудничестве стран БРИКС. http://dknews.kz/opinions/106-policy/41239-sammit-v-syamene-otkroet-vtoroe-zolotoe-desyatiletie-v-sotrudnichestve-stran-briks.html

Nguồn: http://viettimes.vn/nga-trung-quoc-thuc-day-brics-soan-ngoi-my-va-g7-138831.html

Nigeria announces $5.8 billion deal for record-breaking power project

The government of Nigeria has announced the award of a $5.8 billion contract to build what will be the largest power plant in the country.

The 3,050-megawatt Mambila hydroelectric power project in the state of Taraba will be delivered by a consortium of Chinese state-owned construction firms.

The megaproject will feature four dams between 50 and 150 meters tall, and take six years to complete, the Minister of Power, Works and Housing, Babatunde Fashola, told reporters in Abuja.

The Chinese Export-Import Bank will finance 85% of the development, with the Nigerian government contributing 15%.

Minister Fashola claimed the project will deliver far-reaching benefits.

"(Mambila) will have a transformational effect on all of Nigeria's socio-economic development," he said through a government spokesman, "It will have considerable positive impact on electricity supply nationwide, productivity, employment, tourism, technology transfer, rural development, irrigation, agriculture and food production."

False starts

The Mambila hydropower plant has been in development for over 30 years, but previous administrations have made little progress.

In 2007, the Nigerian government awarded a $1.4 billion contract to two Chinese construction firms for a 2,600-megawatt plant, but the agreement broke down soon after.

Attempts were made to revive the deal without success. But the deadlock was broken by conversations between the presidents of China and Nigeria in 2016, according to the spokesman of Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari.

"The major breakthrough in the execution of this project was achieved when President Muhammadu Buhari initiated discussions at the level of the President of the Peoples Republic of China in the course of his State Visit (in 2016)," wrote government official Garba Shehu.

The meeting resulted in the creation of a consortium of Chinese companies to deliver the project, according to Shehu, and an agreement that the Chinese government would commit finance to it.

Power shortage

Despite being one of the largest economies in Africa, over 40% of Nigerians live without access to electricity, according to World Bank figures.

Hydropower, one of the cleanest and cheapest forms of power, is a key target for development as Nigeria is currently exploiting just a fraction of its potential resources.

The country is also seeking to shift away from oil dependency, after plummeting oil prices triggered a recession.

The clear need for the Mambila project could make it more likely to succeed, some analysts believe.

"The prospects of project implementation starting are perhaps stronger than in previous decades," says Elizabeth Donnelly, deputy head of the Africa Programme at UK think tank Chatham House. "Nigeria continues, albeit slowly, with its complex power sector reform and badly needs to generate - and more importantly distribute - more power for its 180 million people."

"Hydroelectricity is an important part of this mix, particularly for rural electrification."

Risk factors

The location of the development could lead to complications.

"There is strong competition for land in Taraba state, which regularly sees outbreaks of ethno-religious violence," says Donnelly. "Such a project, with its need to resettle people, could considerably worsen the conflict dynamics and humanitarian situation in the state."

Environmental groups have also raised concerns about the potential impact.

"If the Mambila dam project does continue, it could mean disastrous environmental and social impacts for those already living in poverty along the banks of the Benue River," warned NGO International Rivers,

The Nigerian government says that 100,000 people will be displaced by the development, and has pledged to resettle and compensate them.

Taraba state Governor, Darius Dickson Ishaku, has welcomed the project for its potential to boost tourism and agriculture.

Chinese interests

The power plant is one of several major Chinese investments in Nigeria, including multiple railway projects.

In January, Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi announced plans to invest a further $40 billion in Nigeria.

"Nigeria is seen as an important power that China wants good relations with," says Yun Sun, a scholar of Chinese foreign policy at US think tank, The Stimson Center.

Sun adds that the primary motivation is financial. Investments such as the Mambila power plant make good business sense.

"Nigeria is using Chinese banks to hire Chinese companies for the project, which will create profits and jobs," she says. "China also wants to identify large projects that make it look good and (Mambila) falls into this category."

But while China is likely to gain from the deal, Sun sees higher risk on the Nigerian side.

"I am less optimistic about the financial impact on the Nigerian economy as the project is very large and there is a question about how Nigeria will repay the 85% finance from the Export-Import Bank," she says. "There could be implications for the national debt."

Scource: http://edition.cnn.com/2017/09/14/africa/nigeria-china-hydropower/index.html

Top 10 countries to invest in Africa: Egypt number one

One of the most important findings of Rand Merchant Bank’s (RMB) seventh edition of Where to Invest in Africa is that the African continent could find itself hovering on the brink of disaster if it continues to depend on its current economic fundamentals and does not usher in economic diversification. Where to Invest in Africa 2018 highlights those countries which have understood the need to adapt to the prolonged slowdown in commodity prices and sluggish levels of production growth – and those which haven’t.

The theme for Where to Invest in Africa 2018 is “Money Talks” and this edition “follows the money” on the African continent to evaluate aspects crucial to each country’s economic performance.  The report focuses on the main sources of dollar revenues in Africa which allows it to measure the most important income generators and identify investment opportunities.

“Over the past three years, some African governments have had to implement deep and painful budget cuts, announce multiple currency devaluations and adopt hawkish monetary policy stances – all as a result of a significant drop in traditional revenues,” says RMB Africa analyst and co-author of Where to Invest in Africa 2018 Celeste Fauconnier.

“Some countries have been more nimble and effective than others in managing shortfalls,” says Nema Ramkhelawan-Bhana, also RMB Africa analyst and an author of the report. “But major policy dilemmas have ensued, forcing governments to balance economically prudent solutions with what is politically palatable.”

“The last three years have sounded an alarm, amplifying what is now a dire need for the economies of Africa to shift their focus from traditional sources of income to other viable alternatives,” says Neville Mandimika, RMB Africa analyst and contributor to Where to Invest in Africa 2018

“These years have exposed a number of African nations to severe economic stress – especially that of liquidity shortages. Unfortunately, there is no quick fix to infuse into a context as complex as this, and traditional forms of revenue will remain a reality for many years to come,” says Ronak Gopaldas, RMB Africa analyst and co-author.

In this edition of Where to Invest in Africa 2018, RMB’s Investment Attractiveness Index, which balances economic activity against the relative ease of doing business, illustrates how subdued levels of economic activity have diluted several scores on the index when compared to last year, resulting in some interesting movements within the Top 10.

Notable omissions from the Top 10 this year are Nigeria and Algeria, which have fallen from numbers six and 10 to numbers 13 and 15 respectively. Ethiopia and Rwanda, on the other hand, have climbed three and four places respectively.

But probably the most notable change is that South Africa has fallen from first place for the first time since the inception of the report, ceding its place to Egypt which is now Africa’s most attractive investment destination.

Egypt displaced South Africa largely because of its superior economic activity score and sluggish growth rates in South Africa, which have deteriorated markedly over the past seven years. South Africaalso faces mounting concerns over issues of institutional strength and governance though in South Africa’s favour are its currency, equity and capital markets which are still a cut above the rest, with many other African nations facing liquidity constraints.

Morocco retained its third position for a third consecutive year having benefitted from a greatly enhanced operating environment since the “Arab Spring” which began in 2010. Surprisingly, Ethiopia, a country dogged by socio-political instability, displaced Ghana to take fourth spot mostly because of its rapid economic growth, having brushed past Kenya as the largest economy in East Africa. Ghana’s slide to fifth position was mostly due to perceptions of worsening corruption and weaker economic freedom.

Kenya holds firm in the Top 10 at number six. Despite being surpassed by Ethiopia, investors are still attracted by Kenya’s diverse economic structure, pro-market policies and brisk consumer spending growth. A host of business-friendly reforms aimed at rooting out corruption and steady economic growth helped Tanzania climb by two places to number seven. Rwanda re-entered the Top 10 having spent two years on the periphery, helped by being one of the fastest reforming economies in the world, high real growth rates and its continuing attempt to diversify its economy.

At number nine, Tunisia has made great strides in advancing political transition while an improved business climate has been achieved by structural reforms, greater security and social stability. Cote d’Ivoire slipped two places to take up the tenth position. Although its business environment scoring is still relatively low, its government has made significant strides in inviting investment into the country leading to a strong increase in foreign direct investment over the years resulting in one of the fastest growing economies in Africa.

For the first time, Nigeria does not feature in the Top 10, with its short-term investment appeal having been eroded by recessionary conditions. Uganda is steadily closing in on the Top 10 though market activity is likely to remain subdued after a tumultuous 2016 marred by election-related uncertainty, a debilitating drought and high commercial lending rates. Though Botswana, Mauritius and Namibiaare widely rated as investment grade economies, they do not feature in the Top 10 mostly because of the relatively small sizes of their markets – market size has been a key consideration in the report’s methodology.

Where to Invest in Africa 2018 also includes 191 jurisdictions around the world, and measures Africa’s performance relative to other country groupings. The unfortunate reality is that African countries are still at the lower end of the global-performance spectrum, which continues to be dominated by the US, UK, Australia and Germany.

Source: https://eturbonews.com/164895/top-10-countries-invest-africa-egypt-number-one

China-Africa Relations: At a Crossroads?

By Linh Tran Huy

Editor: Thibaut Minot

After over 15 years of rapidly expanding economic and political exchanges, China-Africa relations are changing.

During the sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in 2015, China’s President Xi Jinping announced 10 major Sino-African cooperation projects. Covering areas such as industrialization, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, environmental issues, and financial services. With funding for such projects amounting to around US$60 billion, a number of them are already well underway.

The forum reflected the conventional interpretation of Sino-African relations since the early 2000s. China aids Africa’s development through the construction and modernization of local infrastructure and financing apparatus. In return, Africa provides China with a steady supply of natural resources.

Shifting trends, however, are changing the current status quo. A closer look at Sino-African economic relations reveals that investment and trade flows are perhaps not as one-sided as it is commonly portrayed. Indeed, for African companies and entrepreneurs seeking to expand overseas, China is progressively becoming a destination of choice.

China’s investment destinations in Africa

In terms of foreign direct investment (FDI), China’s presence in Africa is undeniable. Between 1998 and 2012 alone, approximately 2,000 Chinese firms invested in 49 different African countries. In 2014, these investments , with South Africa, Algeria, Nigeria, and Zambia as the leading destinations.

While this may account for a fraction of the total stock of FDI in Africa when compared to that of the UK, France, and the US, the growth of China’s FDI in the continent is remarkable and the amount is impressive in relation to its own level of investment in other countries.

Sub-Saharan Africa in particular garners significant attention from China thanks to its wealth in natural resources. In 2013, China became the top destination for Sub-Saharan African exports (over US$20 billion) and the largest exporter to Sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database.

According to Yuusuf Moossajee, Partner at Moollan & Moollan, Dezan Shira & Associates’ partner firm in Mauritius, China has clearly become a leading investor in Africa. In addition to the countries mentioned above, other attractive into Africa are Egypt, Mozambique, Morocco, Côte d’Ivoire, Angola, Kenya, Senegal, and Cameroon.

In Tanzania, for example, China has become the second largest foreign investor, with Chinese MNEs having invested US$2.5 billion in about 500 projects, 70 percent of which are in manufacturing. There are currently around 20,000 businesspeople from China, who are operating in different sectors in rural and urban areas across Tanzania.

Moossajee adds that Mauritius, which has signed investment promotion and protection agreements (IPPAs) with 15 African member states, has successfully positioned itself over the years as the preferred platform for investing into Africa. There is rising interest from Chinese multinational corporations to set up their headquarters and treasury management activities in the Mauritius International Financial Center.

Areas of Chinese investment in Africa

China contributes not only to local infrastructure through buildings and industrial zones, but also to the physical integration of African states through regional projects in the form of roads, railways, waterways, energy infrastructure, and others. This can be seen through the 2015 African Union-China memorandum of understanding to cooperate on major infrastructure and industrialization projects, which represents another step toward the African Union’s Agenda 2063 to have world class infrastructure throughout the continent.

Notable examples include the Merowe Hydropower Dam Project in Sudan, completed in 2009, the West-East Expressway in Algeria linking the North African countries, completed in 2014, and the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway Project, completed in September 2016. All of these projects were overseen by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such as the China International Water and Electric Corporation and the China Civil Construction Corporation, while at least partly financed by Chinese banks.

In contrast with Chinese SOEs, private small and medium enterprises (SMEs) focus on services sectors over infrastructure and resources-related projects. In a 2015 analysis of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) database, International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist Chen Wenjie noted that out of 3,989 projects, 60 percent of all projects were in the services sector, and within that, the business services sector received the most deals (1,053 projects).

This is true for most African countries regardless of their abundance in natural resources. For instance, two-thirds of Chinese projects in both Nigeria and South Africa are in services sectors. Manufacturing-related investment, however, is far less pronounced. Overall, while it seems that Chinese investment is heavily skewed in favor of natural resource projects when looking at aggregate data and the financial gains involved, other sectors are certainly not ignored – and may develop over time at a faster rate than SOE projects.

The rise of Africa’s manufacturing sector

While Chinese investment in African manufacturing is presently low, a number of factors suggest future expansion. At the same time, changes in demographics will temper China’s need for natural resources, resulting in a significant decrease in the pace of China’s investments into Africa’s natural resource sector.

China and Africa’s demographics are moving in opposite directions: China’s population is rapidly aging, while Africa’s fertility rates are high, with half of the continent’s population below the age of 20. UN data forecasts a decrease in the working age population in China from 927 million in 2015 to 838 million by 2035, whereas Africa’s working population could increase from 536 million to 922 million over the same period.

China will need to create fewer and fewer jobs while Africa will be required to create 20 to 30 million jobs every year in the years to come. A smaller population and labor force in the future, in addition to a slowing construction boom, may mean lower demand in China for natural resources However, a second change to note is the progression of wages in China, especially pronounced since 2012. An increase in wages could in fact result in an increase in consumption per capita due to lifestyle changes, and a greater need for resources. Nevertheless, while its appetite for energy and resources in the 2000s largely explained China’s risk-taking approach in its African investments, China will most likely be more selective with its projects in the future.

In contrast, wages in countries such as Ethiopia and Tanzania have remained at relatively low levels. With the and shift to a services-driven economy, China may increasingly relocate its manufacturing to Africa. Ethiopia, for example, recently attracted 15 Chinese investment projects in textiles and electronics through modernizing its industrial zones and creating special economic zones, displaying the potential for such changes.

In China: African business

Sino-African trade flows are no longer a one-way street. According to the China-Africa Economic and Trade Cooperation White Paper, Africa’s FDI in China totaled over US$14 billion by the end of 2012, including US$1.4 billion in that year alone, with countries such as Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, and Nigeria investing in petrochemical industries, manufacturing, and wholesale and retail in China.

According to Moossajee, success stories are already abundant, such as the case of Snow Beer, the world’s best-selling beer, which was produced by a Sino-African joint-venture between SABMiller and China Resources Enterprise. In 2016, SABMiller owned more than 90 breweries, produced 30 beer brands, and owned 23 percent of the market share.

The development initiatives directed by China should foster industrialization and human capital on the African continent, which should in turn encourage the development of more added-value goods and services – to be delivered primarily in China. For instance, the 2015 FOCAC Action Plan aims to boost China-Africa training and education opportunities, with 2,000 degree programs and 30,000 government scholarships available for African students who wish to study in China.

In the past few years, ambitious African companies from a wide range of sectors have looked to expand into China, with a number of large investors originating in South Africa, for instance. Aspen Pharmacare Holdings, a South African pharmaceuticals manufacturer, has increased its exports by two-thirds in 2016 and has used its recent acquisitions of pharmaceutical product lines to boost its number of sales representatives in China to over 600 people. Its Chinese sales force is now the company’s biggest worldwide.

Chemical and energy giant Sasol, also from South Africa, is currently looking to strengthen its position in the growing Chinese market through a new alkoxylation plant in Nanjing, whose construction began the June 8 this year. The plant will allow the firm to meet differentiated customer requirements, such as personal care, detergent, textiles, and other categories.

Naspers, the initially small South African newspaper publisher, failed to expand in China in the 1990s through a subsidiary, yet broke through in 2001 with a US$32 million investment into Tencent, at the time a loss-making tech start-up. The latter’s success catapulted Naspers into a multimedia investing powerhouse and the seventh largest Internet company in the world. Its 34 percent share in Tencent is now worth roughly US$100 billion.

African commercial activity in China is also thriving at a local level. In Guangdong, the manufacturing heart of the country, hubs such as Guangzhou’s Yuexiu and Baiyun districts are flourishing with small African businesses. Trading is the main line of work for many in China to purchase inexpensive goods from wholesale markets, shops, and factories throughout the country to sell them back in Africa. The goods sourced in China by African traders are mainly textiles, cosmetics, and electronic products. A number of business-people are also present to act as intermediaries between investors in African and Chinese factories.

A shifting relationship

While the Sino-African trade relationship was primarily defined in the recent past as infrastructure and development in exchange for natural resources, the trends are changing. The shift in demographics should dampen China’s demand for natural resources, while rising wages in China should encourage the shift of manufacturing capabilities to Africa. Eventually, African labor in China-funded infrastructure projects in Africa could become more attractive than exporting Chinese labor.

As seen, a number of African enterprises, especially joint ventures, are taking off in China. The primary challenge that remains for these newcomers, however, is adapting to an unfamiliar business environment, from the complex regulatory environment to competition with local players.

While the China-Africa economic relationship is just beginning to shift, opportunities are emerging for forward-looking investors mindful of these macro-economic changes.

Source: http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2017/07/27/china-africa-relations-crossroads.html

Understanding China-Africa Relations

“Even as public interest in China-Africa grows, the nature of the relationship changes, often overnight.”

By Young China Watchers

This interview was previously published on the Young China Watchers’ blog and is reprinted here with kind permission. Young China Watchers is a global network of China-focused young professionals across nine chapter cities, engaging with the most pressing issues emerging from China today.

Janet Eom is the Research Manager at the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Previously, she researched Chinese activity in Africa at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. She has worked on China-Africa issues in the Strategy and Policy Unit of the Office of the President in Rwanda and conducted field research on the role of Chinese business and investment in Rwandan development. Young China Watchers’ Jan Philipp Poeter recently spoke with Eom about a recent report in Chinese investment on the continent, and what the China-Africa relationship can teach us about development.

Young China Watchers: Over the years, you have specialized in China-Africa relations, and especially Chinese economic activity in Africa. What triggered your initial interest in “China in Africa”?

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Janet Eom: I’ve always been interested in poverty reduction and economic development. As a kid, I found myself wondering why my neighbors were struggling with obesity while others abroad were dying from malnutrition. I wanted to learn how to fix the disparities. In college, I became interested in Rwanda: Its parliament is 64 percent women; its corruption rate is the fourth-lowest in Africa; and it ranks second in ease of doing business in sub-Saharan Africa. Demographically, Africa is a very young continent of some of the fastest growing economies in the world. We shouldn’t generalize, but I think there is real positivity, entrepreneurship, and dynamism across the continent.

In Africa, I discovered China. I met policymakers in Rwanda who were learning how to engage with China productively. What did China offer that was synergistic with their own initiatives for growth? In a place that is landlocked, devoid of natural resources, and geographically small, what are the Chinese doing? China’s rapid rise has given way to changing notions of what it means to “develop.” We now see new global partnerships. The China-Africa relationship forces me to reassess what I know about “the right way to do things” in developing countries. That’s why I continue engaging with it.

Your insight is shaped by your experience working on the ground in Rwanda. How differentiated is China’s approach to the variety of countries, peoples, and culture in Africa, with regards to its investments and partnerships?

You’re right to acknowledge the heterogeneity. All 54 African countries have unique stories. China has its own impressive geographical, cultural, and linguistic diversity. Therefore, when China goes to Africa, local circumstances matter. In fact, certain Chinese provinces specialize in certain kinds of work in Africa. The Gaza-Hubei Friendship Farm was created when grain-producing Hubei province signed an agreement with Mozambique’s Gaza province, leading to several agricultural projects. The Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone in Igbesa, Nigeria, began as a partnership between Guangdong province and Nigeria’s Ogun state government.

It’s a common mistake to put too much emphasis on a singular, mammoth “China” making all the decisions. Likewise, African governments vary in how much they want to engage with China and how much they want to hold China accountable to local development agendas. This influences how China acts in that particular country. For example, the Ethiopian government has been strongly committed to manufacturing partnerships and technology transfer. This has led to projects such as the Huajian shoe factory outside Addis Ababa. Now, actors on both sides are trying to replicate the successes of this Chinese factory in neighboring African countries.

In addition, China’s involvement in Africa can influence domestic politics. Back in 2006, former Zambian president Michael Sata ran his presidential race on a platform that referred to Chinese investors as exploitative “infestors.” China’s approach and the African response will certainly vary depending on the context.

With your colleagues at CARI, you recently published a policy brief on Chinese financing of African development projects. What are the main takeaways, and what are the research obstacles when it comes to data accessibility and reliability?

After analyzing data from 2000 to 2014, we found some stark differences between our estimates and those of other data efforts. Our takeaways are that when it comes to Chinese loans to Africa:

a) The Chinese do not commit enormous sums of money;

b) Chinese debt cancellation is not huge;

c) China Eximbank is not lending more than the World Bank;

d) The Chinese do not primarily offer loans to access natural resources; and

e) Chinese loans do not disproportionately go to resource-rich, poorly governed countries. For example, we found that the top sector financed by Chinese loans is transportation (roads, railways, airports, and harbors), not oil or mining. The top recipient of Chinese loans was Angola, a resource-rich country, followed by Ethiopia, a resource-poor country.

One research obstacle is a dearth of information: Neither Chinese policy banks nor African recipients regularly publish figures on financing agreements. Ironically, another obstacle is inaccurate information—rumored projects find their way into media stories, which snowball into exaggerations and half-truths. We spent hundreds of hours analyzing the available data, using Chinese, French, Portuguese, and Arabic language skills as well as rigorous cross-checking. Our sources ranged from official ministries of finance to our own contacts in China and Africa. Often, we look for a photo of the project as proof. You would be amazed at the number of announced projects that never happen, but distort the numbers when counted as complete.

Western media often suggests China’s economic approach to African countries only benefits the Chinese side—contrasting the narrative of Western forms of development aid. What are your overall observations on the benefits of China’s engagement for African development?

One benefit of China in Africa is that African countries get more choice in terms of who to engage with. When a country wants to build a massive railway, it may choose to work with the Chinese for any number of reasons, such as speed of construction or pricing of the project. Or maybe China’s “non-interference” policy is attractive to countries that want the agency to keep governing in ways Western partners would frown upon. However, the non-interference policy is changing—China has been contributing to peacekeeping in places like South Sudan, where security situations are impacting economic decisions.

Sustainability is important. For one, there could be stronger corporate social responsibility mechanisms on both sides. China has its own policies, but many companies that go to Africa find that such policies are not relevant on-the-ground where local governance matters more. Chinese companies easily become complicit in what the African environment condones. If there is a lot of corruption in a country, companies are more likely to engage in corrupt practices. If there aren’t concrete regulations against environmental degradation, companies are more likely to operate unsustainably. Even when there are local laws, Chinese companies don’t always understand them. Therefore, effective communication is important as both China and African countries build regulations.

Also, I think there is a lot of untapped potential in technology transfer. A Chinese plastics factory or rice farm may be productive now, but these projects should create an effective transfer of knowledge to local workers. This is what I mean by sustainability: It’s not just about the immediateness of Chinese engagement in Africa, but also the long-term effects of every commitment.

The success of CARI reflects a strong and growing interest in China-Africa relations. What components of this area are still misunderstood and might deserve more attention from the YCW community going forward?

Although many of us focus on government exchanges, we shouldn’t underestimate the importance of people-to-people relations. Because cultural and linguistic barriers between Chinese and Africans can lead to misunderstandings, resources need to be dedicated to cultivating personal associations. One interesting solution is to support more cultural and educational exchanges. As I said before, Africa is a young continent, and I think student-to-student interactions hold great potential. What do African students returning from studying in China do when they return to their home countries? Some may work as translators for Chinese companies, but others may bring their China experience into another industry that previously had little understanding of Chinese culture. And can more Chinese students go to African countries for longer periods of time? Given that many projects consist of daily interactions, whether between managers or general laborers, having more Chinese actors with an understanding of the local culture and language will be important. There will always be challenges, but closer and more frequent contact between individuals can help ensure that the China-Africa relationship is a committed one.

Even as public interest in China-Africa grows, the nature of the relationship changes, often overnight. For example, from 2004, China-Africa trade had been growing steadily for nearly a decade, but there was a sharp dive in 2015, a tough year for China. African exporters of natural resources were especially hard hit. The drop in commodity prices meant that the value of African exports also fell. Any China-Africa practitioner should be willing to quickly adapt to changing global circumstances; some aspects may be predictable, but few are set in stone. This is what’s really exciting about the China-Africa relationship—because it’s at the very center of a lot of global upheavals as well as opportunities, new possibilities for shaping the engagement are going to continue to emerge for some time to come.

Source: http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/understanding-china-africa-relations/