Vào tháng 11 năm 2020, Viện Các vấn đề Quốc tế Nam Phi đã công bố một nghiên cứu có tiêu đề "Sự trỗi dậy của Nga ở Châu Phi: Zimbabwe và Mozambique" của Dzvinka Kachur.
Báo cáo xem xét hai ví dụ về mối quan hệ châu Phi-Nga đang hồi sinh: Zimbabwe và Mozambique. Nó cung cấp một nghiên cứu chi tiết về các hoạt động của Nga ở hai quốc gia này. Trọng tâm chính là các ngành công nghiệp khai thác, mua bán vũ khí và hợp tác chính trị.
The Conversation đã đăng vào ngày 25 tháng 11 năm 2020 một bài bình luận có tiêu đề "Trump's Legacy in Africa and What to Expect from Biden" của Francis Owusu, Đại học Bang Iowa và Padraig Carmody và Ricardo Reboredo, cả hai đều tại Trinity College Dublin.
Các tác giả xem lại những gì chính quyền Trump đã làm ở châu Phi và cố gắng dự đoán những gì sẽ được giữ lại và những gì sẽ thay đổi trong chính quyền Biden.
FairPlanet đăng vào ngày 10 tháng 12 năm 2020 một bài bình luận có tiêu đề "The New Face of China-Africa Relations Amid COVID-19" của Bob Koigi.
Sự bùng phát của coronavirus đã mang lại cho mối quan hệ Trung Quốc-Châu Phi một chiều hướng mới mà Trung Quốc dự kiến sẽ đạt được khi họ chuyển tải các nguồn tài nguyên của mình khắp lục địa.
Năm nay đánh dấu 20 năm Ngày thành lập Diễn đàn Hợp tác Trung Quốc-Châu Phi (FOCAC). Ngày 12/10, Chủ tịch Tập Cận Bình và Tổng thống Macky Sall của Senegal, đương kim Chủ tịch FOCAC châu Phi, đã ra thông điệp chúc mừng chung đánh dấu sự kiện quan trọng này. Nắm bắt bình minh của thế kỷ mới và xu thế hòa bình, phát triển cách đây 20 năm, Trung Quốc và các nước anh em ở châu Phi đã quyết định khởi xướng FOCAC để thúc đẩy hợp tác cùng có lợi. Kể từ đó, đại gia đình Trung Quốc và các quốc gia châu Phi đã có nền tảng riêng cho đối thoại tập thể và cơ chế hợp tác thiết thực, mở ra một chương hoàn toàn mới trong quan hệ Trung Quốc-châu Phi.
- Năm 2019, vốn đầu tư trực tiếp của Trung Quốc vào châu Phi đạt 49,1 tỷ USD, tăng gần 100 lần so với năm 2000; Thương mại Trung Quốc-Châu Phi đạt 208,7 tỷ USD, gấp 20 lần quy mô của năm 2000. Trung Quốc là đối tác thương mại lớn nhất của Châu Phi trong 11 năm liên tiếp và đã đóng góp hơn 20% vào tăng trưởng của Châu Phi trong một số năm.
- Trung Quốc đã cung cấp khoảng 120.000 học bổng chính phủ cho các nước châu Phi, thành lập 61 Viện Khổng Tử và 44 Phòng học Khổng Tử phối hợp với 46 quốc gia châu Phi, cử 21.000 bác sĩ và y tá trong các đội y tế đến 48 quốc gia châu Phi, điều trị cho khoảng 220 triệu bệnh nhân châu Phi...
Read here: Two Decades of A Shared Journey toward New Heights in the New Era— Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
The Diplomat đã xuất bản vào ngày 2 tháng 11 năm 2020 một bài phân tích có tiêu đề "China's Multifaceted COVID-19 Diplomacy Across Africa" của R. Maxwell Bone và Ferdinando Cinotto, cả hai đều là sinh viên tại Đại học Cambridge.
Trung Quốc đã thực hiện một cuộc tấn công ngoại giao và kinh tế trên khắp châu Phi, tìm cách chứng tỏ mình là một đối tác đáng tin cậy và xóa bỏ những lời chỉ trích về cách xử lý ban đầu đối với virus. Mặc dù thực tế là vào đầu đại dịch, một số người đã dự đoán rằng nó sẽ dẫn đến suy thoái quan hệ giữa Trung Quốc và châu Phi, nhưng giờ đây rõ ràng là Đảng Cộng sản Trung Quốc đã cố gắng sử dụng đại dịch như một cơ hội để tăng cường mối quan hệ đó.
While the coronavirus pandemic has accelerated the declining influence of Western countries like Canada, Australia and the UK in Africa, China has intentionally kept Africa high on its agenda. But the perception of China in Africa remains complex and multifaceted.
Part of the complexity is the multiplicity of Chinese players with different agendas. For instance, the Chinese government has a specific agenda to gain global influence, while Chinese state-owned enterprises remain closely aligned with the state but aim to maximise profit.
Entrepreneurs, philanthropists and individual citizens all contribute to different views of China in Africa.
CONTEXTUALISING CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS
China has had a longstanding relationship with Africa. China supported countries during their liberation struggles in the 1960s and 1970s, and helped build much-needed regional infrastructure and technical capacity. However, over the past 50 years, the perception of China’s engagement in Africa became increasingly polarised, with the image of China as an investor and partner on the one hand, and a neo-colonial power on the other.
The reality is that China needs Africa as much as Africa needs China, especially as China tries to increase its soft power globally. China’s slowing economy, decline in value-added manufacturing, industrial overcapacity, rising labour costs and rapidly aging population are some of the key reasons behind China’s increased investment in Africa over the past two decades. China is also dependent on African countries’ support in the international political arena, especially as it faces a hostile external environment. This is evidenced by the support of many African countries for China’s Xinjiang policy in the UN Human Rights Council. Furthermore, China and the US are descending into a new type of cold war, the tensions between China and India are escalating, and China faces mounting international pressure over the security law it imposed on Hong Kong. China will require more political support from African countries.
China uses a multi-pronged engagement strategy as a risk mitigator, as not all of its activities are positively regarded. Its rapid economic growth and reduction of poverty over the past four decades provides African countries with a development model to emulate. According to the World Bank, more than 850 million Chinese people have been lifted out of extreme poverty, accounting for more than 70% of global poverty reduction since the 1980s. Since China’s development challenges were similar to Africa’s, China’s engagement is strongly focused on sharing development lessons and capacity building. However, this strategy alone is not always successful. For instance, an Afrobarometer survey found that while China’s development model was respected in countries such as Tunisia, it was perceived to have less influence than the US or France.
Public perception is based on experience and media reports rather than on rigorous research. Furthermore, Western media is more widespread and influential in Africa than outlets from other continents. However, Western media generally depicts a negative picture of Chinese activities in Africa, often choosing to repeat the narrative of China as a neo-colonial power challenging democracy and exploiting resources in Africa. As Cambridge scholar Emma Mawdsley highlights, Western media has a tendency to refer to the ‘Chinese’ or ‘China’, as if the various Chinese actors all shared the same interest and a decided preference for focusing on China’s negative impacts on the continent. The result has been an oversimplification of the very diverse activities and dimensions of the China–Africa relationship. That is why the African narrative of China’s broad engagement as a source of ‘deep transformation’ is important.
China’s engagement in Africa has not been only positive. There have been isolated incidents of Chinese non-compliance with local laws across the continent that tarnish its image. For instance, with respect to labour laws, there have been cases in different countries of mistreatment of local workers, harsh working conditions, and more. The Chinese have also been accused of discriminating against Africans at Chinese-owned businesses, such as hotels and restaurants. Needless to say, most foreign investors struggle to understand and comply with local laws. Responsibility for such actions should be taken. However, an argument can be made that the Chinese receive higher levels of media attention and political intervention than other foreigners conducting similar activities, because the latter do not get similar reports.
While China is generally viewed as a good ally who furthers Africa’s development agenda, Chinese immigrants are perceived more negatively. For instance, according to scholars, Chinese migrants residing in Africa are commonly viewed unfavourably in Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Zambia. In several countries, there is a perception that Chinese people are taking local jobs, especially in the construction sector. Some Chinese citizens have been accused of engaging in exclusionary behavior, both socially and within business, which also hurts perceptions.
The coronavirus pandemic has also highlighted the fragility of the social contract, revealing the lack of understanding and mistrust between ordinary Chinese and Africans. For instance, many Africans in China reported routine discrimination due to people’s fears that Africans would infect Chinese people. The social and diplomatic backlash was immense, and the impact on long-term relations remains unclear.
THE FORCES SHAPING THE PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA IN AFRICA
Despite these flaws, China continues to use the following to shape the perception of its engagement in Africa:
Skills Development, Training and Scholarships
The Chinese government has spent millions of dollars and countless resources on professional training, skills development and scholarship for Africans. Around 10,000 African officials are trained in China each year at China’s universities, state bureaus and companies. In addition, China plans to offer 12,000 scholarships to African students for the next academic year, more than all Western countries combined. These have developed into a systematic campaign to promote China’s development achievements and the related model, and create opportunities for bilateral cooperation.
Through frequently organised and sophisticated training activities, and by providing scholarships and exchange opportunities for African politicians, journalists, intellectuals, business elites and military attachés, China continues to try to win African hearts and minds and convert them into political and social capital.
High-Level Political Commitments to Friendship and Solidarity
Many African leaders see their relationship with China as crucial. For example, in 2018, twice as many African presidents attended the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in Beijing as did the UN General Assembly in New York.
Political engagement at the highest level of Chinese government persists. For instance, on 17 June 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping and many African presidents attended the Extraordinary China–Africa Summit On Solidarity Against Covid-19, where Xi was calling for more efforts to mobilise necessary resources and stick together. He also promised to write off some loans to Africa. Although interest-free loans comprise just a fraction of the debt that Africa owes China, such high-level political commitments show that China is willing to continue to support Africa even while dealing with coronavirus itself.
Reshaping Development Finance in Africa
In the past two decades, China has acquired more global financial influence with the highest amount of reserves at $3.1 trillion, the Belt and Road Initiative costing about $1.3 trillion by 2027 and the creation of institutions such as the New Development Bank, in part to finance its ‘going out’ policy. China has also shifted its engagement with Africa from development assistance to development finance through its own domestic institutions (namely, the China Development Bank, China Export–Import Bank and the China–Africa Fund for Industrial Cooperation). The China–Africa Development Fund, for example, has invested more than $4.6 billion in 92 projects in 36 African countries.
China’s funds continue to fill a gap in the need for financing of Africa’s infrastructure, and provide a much-needed alternative to traditional development and commercial financing options.
CONCLUSION
China’s reputation in Africa generally remains positive. Although there are issues that emerge from time to time that could strain China’s reputation, solutions are expeditiously found. That said, to sustain a positive image, China needs to trickle down positive engagement with more unified intention. Coronavirus has demonstrated that China will continue to weather storms with Africa. However, commentators argue that the pandemic could actually have the opposite effect and end what has been a strong engagement. What is clear is that the bargaining power of African leaders is increasing. They are trying to find more African solutions to African problems.
African countries are seeking to play a greater role in multilateral efforts without becoming a pawn in China–US wrangles. It is therefore important for China to continue to consolidate its engagement strategy while focusing on long-term results.
Hangwei Li is an award-winning journalist and a PhD candidate in Politics and International Studies at SOAS, University of London. She was also a visiting scholar at Harvard Kennedy School and a researcher at the Global Development Policy Center.
Jacqueline Muna Musiitwa Esq is the Founder and Managing Partner at Hoja Law Group, and a researcher on China–Africa relations and African political economy. In 2019, she was appointed to the UN Committee for Development Policy. She is also a Young Global Leader of the World Economic Forum.
Read here
The Institute of Chinese Studies ở Delhi đã xuất bản vào tháng 7 năm 2020 một phân tích có tiêu đề "To Craft a COVID-19 Narrative, China Needs Africa" của Veda Vaidyanathan.
Phân tích xem xét bản chất đang thay đổi của tình đoàn kết châu Phi với Trung Quốc và thảo luận về cách các nước châu Phi thu được lợi ích từ mối quan hệ này. Nó nhấn mạnh cách COVID-19 đe dọa động lực này.
