"What the Mugabe Coup Says about China's Plans for Africa

The South China Morning Post published on 1 December 2017 an article titled "What the Mugabe Coup Says about China's Plans for Africa" by Bobby Jordan. 

While Beijing dismisses claims it was involved in regime change in Zimbabwe, the author suggests that the downfall of Robert Mugabe demonstrates the increasingly active role of China in Africa, especially in countries where Western nations have fallen out of favor.

http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2122492/what-mugabe-coup-says-about-chinas-plans-africa

STUDY ON SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN AFRICA AND CHINA

This study, commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Poverty Reduction Center in China (IPRCC), looks at both Africa’s and China’s experiences with special economic zones (SEZs) to date with a focus on SEZs in three African countries – namely Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zambia – and two SEZ case studies in China. The study does not aim to analyse the adequacy of SEZs as a means for industrialization, but focuses on how to use SEZs effectively. Findings presented in this study derive from extensive research on, and analysis of, primary and secondary sources as well as from field research conducted in Ethiopia, Nigeria and Zambia throughout April 2015. The study seeks to answer three main research questions: How have Africa and China performed so far with SEZs? How could Africa benefit from China’s experience with SEZs? How could China-Africa cooperation on SEZs be enhanced in future?

http://chinaafricaadvisory.com/2015/12/17/undpiprcc-comparative-study-on-special-economic-zones-in-africa-and-china/

http://www.cn.undp.org/content/china/en/home/library/south-south-cooperation/if-africa-builds-nests--will-the-birds-come-.html

CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR AFRICA

The study presents a summary and analysis of best available information on the Belt and Road Initiative in the context of China-Africa relations and offers scenarios on how the Initiative is likely to unfold in Africa. The study offers a first-of-its-kind overview of key actors and institutional arrangements of the Belt and Road Initiative in China and Africa before developing a ranking of African countries that are likely to become part of the Initiative. The study finds that in addition to South Africa and Egypt, Angola, Kenya and Tanzania are likely to be immediate Belt and Road Initiative countries and the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Morocco, and Mozambique to join in the near future.

 http://assets.wwfke.panda.org/downloads/chinas_belt_and_road_initiative_and_its_implications_for_africa__1_.pdf

China in Africa: what challenges for a reforming EU development policy? Illustrations from country cases

During the past decade, the EU has introduced several reforms to make collective development policy more coherent and effective. At the same time, development exists alongside (and sometimes competes with) other policy fields, particularly in settings where the EU has strong economic interests. Reforms to EU external relations take place against a backdrop of rapidly intensifying economic and political relations between China and African countries, a debate often framed as increasing competition with the EU. This article argues that Chinese engagement in Africa poses challenges for the EU's development policy, but these differ considerably across African countries. We look at three country cases to show that China's increasing engagement with individual African countries does not cause EU collective action failures.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/dpr.12195/full

A new climate trilateralism? Opportunities for cooperation between the EU, China and African countries on addressing climate change

The Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is the first universal, legally binding instrument requiring both developed and developing countries to tackle climate change as a joint responsibility. While developed countries reconfirmed their obligation to provide support to developing countries under the Paris Agreement, there is also a growing recognition of the importance and potential of new partnerships among, and with, developing countries through South-South and trilateral cooperation.
The European Union (EU), having shown considerable leadership in forging the Paris Agreement, also expressed its intent to work trilaterally with China and African countries to support the treaty’s implementation. The new EU strategy on China proposes to turn “what is often perceived as EU-China competition in Africa into “greater cooperation” and to pursue “joint approaches” to “speed up the implementation of the Paris Agreement wherever possible, including the implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions”. Cooperation on addressing climate change has been part of China’s Africa policy since 2006, and China has been increasingly supporting African countries through South-South cooperation as well as trilateral cooperation with involvement of United Nations entities. In 2015, China committed to significantly scaling-up its efforts in the area by pledging 20 billion Chinese yuan (USD 3.1 billion) to its recently established South-South Cooperation Climate Fund, which will focus on supporting African countries.
Trilateral cooperation between the EU, China and African countries should be guided by Africa’s priorities. Fifty-three African countries have communicated their national plans on addressing climate change under the Paris Agreement through the submission of so-called (Intended) Nationally Determined Contributions ((I)NDCs). Based on an analysis of INDCs and a review of existing partnerships and recent pan-African developments, this briefing paper proposes for EU-China-Africa trilateral cooperation to initially focus on renewable energy. The African Union’s newly launched Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) provides a possible entry point at the regional and national levels. The EU and China should build on their existing pledges of support for AREI and jointly explore with African partners the development of pilot projects towards AREI’s goal of installing at least 10 GW of new and additional renewable energy generation capacity by 2020 and establishing the Africa Renewable Energy Institute. The single largest pledge in support of AREI by an EU member state has been made by Germany, which is well positioned to spearhead the proposed trilateral cooperation building on its technical expertise and its G20 Presidency objective to support Africa’s development, including in the area of renewable energy.


Moritz Weigel and Alexander Demissie are the Founding Directors of The ChinaAfricaAdvisory, an independent China and Africa-focussed advisory firm, based in Cologne, Germany, that services governments, organisations and businesses around the globe towards fostering sustainable development in African countries.

https://www.die-gdi.de/discussion-paper/article/a-new-climate-trilateralism-opportunities-for-cooperation-between-the-eu-china-and-african-countries-on-addressing-climate-change/

China and Zimbabwe: After Mugabe

What is China’s role in the downfall of Robert Mugabe? As Zimbabwe’s major investor and provider of development finance, China has considerable interests in the country’s stability. Yet it is highly unlikely that there was any official Chinese involvement in Robert Mugabe's resignation and the end of his 37 years in power. Beijing would have little to gain and much to lose from becoming directly involved. Why is this the case? And how is Mugabe's resignation likely to affect China-Zimbabwe relations going forward? 

First, Chinese leaders have a long-term mindset and China’s domestic politics is always foremost in that mindset. Direct involvement in even an informal coup would break very long-standing principles that are part of China’s core foreign policy — and it would signal that “interference in the internal affairs of other countries” is acceptable. Beijing does not want, in any way, to promote this idea. It is far more likely that they sat back and waited for Mugabe’s endgame to be played out by Zimbabweans -- which is what appears to have happened. And then they would move smoothly to befriend the official winner. This is what happened, for example, in Zambia when Michael Sata, an outspoken critic of Chinese investment, was elected as president in 2011.

Second, even though many consider Zimbabwe a "client state" of China, Zimbabwe in fact receives relatively little official finance from China's two policy banks, the China Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) or the China Development Bank (CDB). Zimbabwe was one of the first countries in Africa to receive China Eximbank policy loans in the late 1990s, but the country defaulted on these early loans, and  Eximbank had to turn to Sinosure (China's export credit insurance corporation) for reimbursements. As a result, both policy banks have been reluctant to lend more in subsequent years, despite repeated requests. Zimbabwe does not even rank in the top 10 of Chinese loan recipients in Africa in terms of aggregate loans received from China between 2000 and 2015. 

Further to this, as usual, some news media have misunderstood the difference between "under discussion" and actual loan agreements. For example, the Zimbabwean government has been negotiating with China Eximbank over the past three years to borrow approximately $1.2 billion USD in preferential export buyer's credits for the expansion of the Hwange Coal Power Plant. China Eximbank set 15 conditions that Zimbabwe had to meet in order to sign the loan agreement, with a critical condition being that Zimbabwe raise 15% of the contract cost. There is no loan, at least, not yet. To put this in context: discussions about rehabilitating Hwange with Chinese cash have been ongoing since at least 2008. (On how African state media trumpet expectations of Chinese largesse while Chinese state media are more realistic, see our post from 2016 on Zimbabwe: "China and Africa: Venus and Mars.")

Third, unlike Angola, which is of strategic value to China -- 12% of China's crude oil imports in 2016 are from Angola -- China does not rely on any sort of Zimbabwean exports of anything. As a result, instability in Zimbabwe, political or otherwise, is of much less concern to China than instability in Angola. China was willing to renegotiate the loan terms with Angola in mid-2015 when low oil prices made repayment difficult for Angola, even issuing more credit lines to float their economy. In contrast, when Zimbabwe failed to repay their loans, China simply reduced lending to a trickle.

Finally, China (CCP) and Zimbabwe (Zanu-PF) do have strong party-to-party ties, and military engagement is also cozy. It is not clear whether this is a strategic coordinated partnership directed by Beijing. Some evidence suggests this, in particular the state visit by President Xi Jinping in late 2015, the Zimbabwe involvement of Norinco, a centrally run military corporation, and the relatively high proportion of military-related loans over the past 15 years in the existing portfolio. Most of the loans for military equipment (mainly aircraft) were taken out around a decade ago and appear to be suppliers' credits rather than Eximbank or CDB loans. On the other hand, a concessional Eximbank loan of $98 million did help finance the construction of Zimbabwe's National Defense College. We wrote about this in a post in 2011. This loan is an interesting example of central support (Eximbank) for a business initiative organized by a Chinese province: Anhui. This loan was secured by profits from a joint-venture in diamond mining between an Anhui company and the Zimbabwe military.

Zimbabwe's military and Anhui province have a strong relationship organized largely around greed and opportunism: Zimbabwe's military leaders have partnered with Chinese construction companies, mining firms, and farming companies from Anhui Province (the latter as I discussed in my latest book: Will Africa Feed China?). Multiple stakeholders in China complicate China's economic statecraft.  I do not know the extent of personal ties among the Anhui Province companies and the new leadership in Zimbabwe, but I expect that they are likely to be quite good. This "mutually beneficial relationship" would be an interesting angle to investigate further.

How will ordinary Chinese investment be affected by Mugabe's resignation? Probably not at all.  As we wrote here in 2014, Chinese companies have also been affected by Zimbabwe's indigenization law which requires 51% of large investments to be locally owned. (See also a great 2016 analysis on this by Yun Sun.) There isn't any indication yet that Zimbabwe will reverse this legislation. 

With appreciation to CARI's Jyhjong Hwang for her contributions to this analysis.

http://www.chinaafricarealstory.com/

US and Sudan rebuild ties after decades of sanctions

Abu Dhabi's The National carried a story dated 28 November 2017 titled "US and Sudan Rebuild Ties after Decades of Sanctions" by Joyce Karam. 

The commentary suggests that the recent thaw in US-Sudan ties is not about resolving every outstanding issue but is rather a recognition that engagement achieves results, whereas decades of sanctions and economic and cultural isolation didn't achieve much.

The Trump administration lifted a 20-year-old sanctions regime on Sudan and some predict the counry could be removed from a list of state sponsors of terror

For many Americans, Sudan is at worst known for providing a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and the genocide in Darfur and at best, for being the world’s largest gum arabic producer.

For the US government, however, and since Barack Obama’s quiet engagement with Khartoum in 2015, the country represents an opportunity for military, intelligence, and economic cooperation.

Last month, the Trump administration lifted a 20-year-old sanctions regime on Sudan, continuing in the footsteps of the Obama White House, which loosened those sanctions one week before leaving office in January.

The improved US-Sudan relations could eventually lead to the removal of Sudan from the list of state sponsors of terror, experts told The National.

The détente is taking place in parallel to Khartoum’s regional realignment away from Iran and closer to the Arab world.

This month saw a peak in the US thaw in relations with Sudan. Weeks after lifting the sanctions, Khartoum announced on November 17 that it’s severing all trade and military ties with North Korea, a key demand by Washington that was negotiated during a visit to Sudan that same week by US deputy secretary of state John Sullivan.

In a speech from Khartoum, Mr Sullivan presented a path for Sudan to become a “full partner” by improving its human rights record, and seeking “peace within its borders and with its neighbours”.

On Sudan’s state sponsor of terror listing, a status it gained in 1993, Mr Sullivan said: "We are prepared to continue discussions with the government of Sudan on this issue, and to engage with them on all that would be required to have them removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.”

In March, the US and Sudan resumed military relations ahead of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) decision to open an office there a month later. Then in September, an amended version of Mr Trump’s travel ban removed Sudan from the list of countries facing immigration restrictions to the US.

Kelsey Lilley an associate director of the Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington told The National that the new US-Sudan openness is transactional in nature and is based on a quiet process that Mr Obama started with Khartoum a year before leaving office.

“It was very smart and purposeful by the Trump administration to take the baton [from the Obama team], to continue and own the engagement process with Sudan,” Ms Lilley said. According to the US State Department, Washington’s engagement with Khartoum is based on a five-track plan, which includes ceasing hostilities in conflict regions, improving humanitarian access throughout Sudan and refraining from interference in South Sudan. The US also wants more cooperation to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group operating across several African countries and building cooperation on counter terrorism.

Steve McDonald, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson centre, said the US should temper its expectations of such openness from Sudan president Omar Bashir, who is accused by the ICC of genocide and war crimes in the Darfur conflict.

“Bashir is still under International Criminal Court indictment and the government continuing to close democratic space, human rights violations still persist in the Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Darfur,” Mr McDonald warned. He added that it remains to be seen if Sudan stops arming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition in South Sudan fighting.

Still, Ms Lilley stressed that the US-Sudan thaw is not about resolving every issue but is rather “a recognition that engagement achieves results, whereas decades of sanctions and economic and cultural isolation didn’t achieve much”.

Besides the economic opportunities that Sudan presents the United States across North and Central Africa and particularly in rivalling China in the continent, the country’s geopolitical shifts away from Iran and North Korea have been also welcomed by Washington.

In 2014, Sudan expelled Iranian diplomats before cutting all its relations with Tehran in 2016. In parallel, Khartoum improved its ties with Saudi Arabia and GCC countries, sending soldiers to Yemen in 2015 and receiving a $1 billion (Dh3.67bn) deposit in return. Just in 2017, Mr Bashir has visited Saudi Arabia four times where he met either King Salman or Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman or both.

“The attempt by the Trump administration to align powers in the Middle East and North Africa against Iran plays into this [engagement], with Sudan agreeing to break ties with Iran and come closer to Saudi Arabia,” said Mr McDonald.

Washington praised Khartoum, after severing its ties with North Korea this month.

“Isolating the North Korean regime is a top priority for the United States, and is a key element to maintaining peace and stability worldwide,” the state department said. “The United States is grateful for Sudan’s commitment to take these important steps in light of the critical threat posed by the DPRK”

Pressuring Sudan on geopolitical alignments also shows that "there is no place that the US government will not pursue [in isolating] North Korea—whether in Africa or elsewhere globally" said Ms Lilley.

While Mr McDonald warns that Mr Bashir “can not be trusted” and “US may be bound for a very rocky road ahead”, Ms Lilley applauds a continuation of a calculated transactional engagement by Washington toward Khartoum.

Issues of debt relief, removal from state sponsor of terror could be next on the table in return for more constructive counterterrorism and regional peaceful gestures from Sudan.

https://www.thenational.ae/world/the-americas/us-and-sudan-rebuild-ties-after-decades-of-sanctions-1.679375?utm_source=The+Corporate+Council+on+Africa+%28Revised%29&utm_campaign=f0786ebf58-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_11_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4004c77546-f0786ebf58-325773069